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Abstract
Short-termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when gen-
erating Beauty Contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two-period market with
persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors
and find that prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity
trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning to reassess inferences
(about fundamentals) made during the trading game’s early stages. This behavior
introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two
stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informa-
tional efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as
empirical regularities.
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It might have been supposed that competition between expert profession-
als [. . . ] would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It
happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and
speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons are [. . . ]
largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts [. . . ] but
with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time
ahead of the general public. (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, 1936)
Does short-termism breed informational price inefficiency? We find that this need not
be the case—even though Beauty Contests arise—provided that liquidity shocks are per-
sistent. We examine this question in a two-period market where short-term, informed,
competitive, risk-averse agents trade on private information and to accommodate liquid-
ity supply while facing persistent demand from liquidity traders.
Traders’ “myopia” ranks high on the regulatory agenda, which testifies to policy mak-
ers’ concern about the possibly detrimental effects of such myopia on the market.1 Debate
over this issue has a long tradition in economic analysis. Indeed, short-term trading is
the very basis of Keynes’s dismal view of financial markets. According to his “Beauty
Contest” analysis, traders’ investment decisions are driven by anticipation of their peers’
changing whims and not by actual knowledge of the companies they trade. As a result,
competition among informed traders does not necessarily counteract the actions of unin-
formed traders.2 It has been claimed that this type of behavior introduces a particular
form of informational inefficiency whereby traders tend to put a disproportionately high
weight on public information in their forecast of asset prices (see Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006)). Furthermore, the anticipation of short-term price movements may induce mar-
ket participants to act in a way that amplifies such movements (Shin (2010)) and may
contribute to crashes. We show that the Beauty Contest analogy for financial markets
tells just part of the story because, when liquidity traders’ demand shocks are persistent,
prices reflect average expectations not only of the fundamental value but also of liquidity
trading.
In this paper we present a two-period model of short-term trading with asymmet-
ric information, in which investors observe an exogenous public signal—in the tradition
of dynamic noisy rational expectations models (see, e.g., Singleton (1987), Brown and
Jennings (1989)). We find that if liquidity trading is persistent then there is strategic
complementarity in the use of private information, and we provide sufficient conditions
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for that complementarity to generate multiple extremal stable equilibria that can be
ranked in terms of price informativeness, liquidity, and volatility. In particular, we find
that there are two extremal equilibria: a “high information” equilibrium (HIE) and a
“low information” equilibrium (LIE). At the HIE, prices are good signals of the under-
lying fundamentals, volatility is low, and liquidity is high; the LIE displays the opposite
properties in terms of informational efficiency, volatility, and liquidity.
In a model identical to ours but with transient liquidity trading (and without an ex-
ogenous public signal), Allen et al. (2006) find that prices (i) are driven by higher-order
expectations (HOEs) about fundamentals, (ii) underweight private information (with re-
spect to the optimal statistical weight), and (iii) are farther away from fundamentals than
investors’ consensus. The same result obtains in our setup when liquidity trading is tran-
sient. A similar result also holds at the LIE when liquidity trading is persistent. However,
at the HIE we find that the price is more strongly tied to fundamentals (as compared with
investors’ consensus) and overweights average private information (as compared with the
optimal statistical weight).3 Therefore, the Beauty Contest feature of asset prices does
not necessarily imply that prices are worse estimators of fundamentals compared to con-
sensus; neither does it imply that prices exhibit inertia or react slowly to changes in
the fundamentals. Hence we can establish the limits of this Beauty Contest analogy for
financial markets and refute the view that short-term trading always amplifies demand
shocks or necessarily leads to uninformative prices or “excess” volatility.4 We also identify
the circumstances under which informed traders stabilize the market by counteracting
the actions of liquidity traders (at the HIE). Finally, we deliver sharp predictions on
asset pricing that are consistent with the received empirical evidence (including noted
anomalies).
A crucial hypothesis of our model is that liquidity trading displays persistence. This
hypothesis can be viewed as a reduced-form assumption for the performance–flow rela-
tionship’s effect on the holdings of mutual funds. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that
mutual funds faced with aggregate redemption orders will curtail their positions and en-
gage in “fire sales”. This dynamic generates a temporary and allegedly uninformed price
pressure that reduces fund performance. As shown by evidence on the performance–flow
relationship (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)), poor performance
in turn breeds investors’ redemptions, thus engendering further fire sales. The implica-
tion is that uninformed orders can display persistence. Building on this intuition, Lou
(2012) tests a capital flow–based explanation for some well-known empirical asset pricing
regularities and finds that mutual funds’ shareholdings display strong persistence at a
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quarterly frequency.5 Campbell and Kyle (1993) follow a different approach and disen-
tangle the properties of the noise process from the properties of returns; these authors
find that liquidity traders’ positions are highly persistent at an annual frequency. In sum,
the persistence of liquidity trading appears to be a natural and plausible assumption that
is backed by empirical evidence.
The mechanism responsible for complementarities is as follows. Suppose a risk-averse,
short-term trader has a private signal on the firm’s fundamentals. His willingness to spec-
ulate on that signal is directly related to how well he can estimate the next period’s price
and, significantly, such willingness is also inversely related to the trader’s uncertainty
about the liquidation price. Indeed, the more volatile the price at which the investor un-
winds, the riskier his strategy and the less willing to exploit his private signal the trader
becomes. Yet an average increased response to private information today, increases the
price informativeness and reduces the residual variance of tomorrow’s price conditional
on today’s price. This pushes up the response to the private signal today and may induce
strategic complementarities in the responses to the private signals. For this to happen
the variance reduction effect must be strong enough to overwhelm the usual substitution
effect according to which a more informative price today decreases the weight put by the
trader on his private signal in the estimation of tomorrow’s price. Therefore, a trader’s
willingness to act on private information not only depends on his uncertainty about the
liquidation price but also affects that uncertainty. We argue that this two-sided loop
may account for the existence of multiple stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms
of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency.
The variance reduction effect is potentially strong when liquidity trading is persis-
tent.6 The crux of our argument revolves around a particular type of inference from the
information (as reflected by prices) that arises in this case. If there is persistence then
second-period investors can retrospectively assess their first-period inferences about the
fundamentals—that is, based on the new evidence gathered in the second period. We
therefore term this effect “retrospective inference”. In a market whose investors are both
risk averse and asymmetrically informed, it is well-well known that the price impact of
trades stems from the sum of an “inventory” component and an “inference” component.7
In a static market the two terms are positive, but in a dynamic market it is possible for
retrospective inference to render the inference component negative. That effect dimin-
ishes the price impact of trades, reducing the volatility of the asset price and boosting
the response of traders to private information. The intuition is as follows.
Suppose that second-period informed investors observe a large demand for the asset.
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If in the first period these investors traded aggressively on their private information, then
the first-period price is informative about the fundamentals. Therefore, the bulk of the
price adjustment to fundamentals must have already occurred in the first period. This
reduces the likelihood that demand is being driven by informed trading and thereby makes
it more likely that it is driven by liquidity trading. If there is persistence, then this result
implies that a high demand for the asset from liquidity traders also affected the first-
period aggregate demand—which further implies (for a given price realization) a lower
expectation of the fundamentals. So in this case, a large aggregate demand realization
leads second-period investors to revise downward their expectation of the liquidation
value. This implies in turn that the inference component of the price impact offsets
the inventory component, reducing the latter’s significance. The result is diminished
first-period investor uncertainty about the unwinding price, which boosts the response
of investors to private signals. We have therefore a self-fulfilling loop of strong reaction
to first period private signals which leads to a high information equilibrium. The same
logic leads to a low information equilibrium when one assumes that first-period investors
trade weakly on their private signals.
We show that if retrospective inference is present but the variance reduction effect
moderately strong, then two extremal and stable equilibria arise: the LIE and the HIE.
In the HIE, volatility is low, liquidity is high, and prices closely reflect the underlying
fundamentals; in the LIE, volatility is high, liquidity is low, and prices reflect poorly
underlying fundamentals. If retrospective inference and the variance reduction effect are
very strong then the HIE becomes unstable, in which case the only likely equilibrium to
arise is the LIE.
Our analysis shows that the strength of the retrospective inference loop depends on
traders’ reliance on prices as a source of information for their decisions. Suppose, for
example, that private signals are much more precise than exogenous public information;
then prices are relatively more informative, the loop is very strong, and the HIE is
unstable. When the public signal precision increases, the retrospective inference loop
weakens and thereby stabilizes the HIE. Finally, when precision of the public signal
increases further, the HIE disappears, because the variance reduciton effect is weakened,
and uniqueness occurs at the LIE. Thus, our paper shows that public information plays
an active role in determining the type of market equilibrium when there is short-term
trading.
Our model predicts that the LIE arises under extreme values of public signal precision
(which could be proxied by the number of analysts following a given security). The low-
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information equilibrium is characterized by: (i) a positive inference component of the price
impact; (ii) momentum or reversal, depending on the strength of persistence; (iii) high
expected returns from providing liquidity; (iv) prices that are far from the semi-strong
efficient price; (v) strong short-horizon return predictability from order imbalances; and
(vi) low volume accompanied by high levels of disagreement. For intermediate values of
public signal precision, the HIE can also arise. The high-information equilibrium features
(i) a negative inference component of the price impact, (ii) mild momentum, (iii) low
expected returns from liquidity provision, (iv) prices that are close to the semi-strong
efficient price, (v) weak short-horizon return predictability from order imbalances, and
(vi) high volume accompanied by low levels of disagreement.
It is important to note that the autocovariance of short-term returns is always positive
in the HIE but is positive in the LIE only when liquidity trading is sufficiently persistent.
Since the predictability of liquidity trading is an essential ingredient in multiple equilibria,
it follows that momentum is a consequence of persistence. That being said, the patterns
of prices and price informativeness implied by the two equilibria are markedly different.
In particular, momentum along the HIE (resp., LIE) is a sign that prices are rapidly
(resp., slowly) converging toward the full-information value.
Our model has the following implications:
• When high trade volume is associated with informative prices and with low levels
of disagreement, then this discriminates in favor of the HIE, not only in relation to
the LIE but also in relation to alternative theories based on differences of opinions
(DO) models, in which disagreement is associated with high volume.
• A negative covariance between conditional volatility of returns and volume does not
rule out the applicability of rational expectations models (as suggested by Banerjee
(2011), for example) since it is consistent with ours in some scenarios.
• A negative inference component of the price impact identifies the HIE;8 the ob-
servation of a reversal at short horizons identifies the LIE (under the maintained
hypothesis that our model holds).
• If for “fragile” stocks – in the sense of Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) – there
is a low transaction volume when there is high disagreement, then this would be
evidence for a LIE. Similarly, a high transaction volume for non-fragile stocks about
which there are low levels of disagreement, constitutes evidence for a HIE.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing the related literature,
we analyze the static benchmark. In Section III we study the two-period model, relate it
to the Beauty Contest literature, and present the multiplicity result. We then derive asset
pricing implications and use our model to interpret some aspects of the recent financial
crisis. The paper’s final section summarizes our results and discusses their empirical
implications. Most formal proofs are relegated to the paper’s Appendix. An Online
Appendix offers a detailed robustness analysis of the model.
I Related literature
Our results are related to—and have implications for—three strands of the literature.
First, our paper is related to the literature that investigates the relationship between
the effect of short-term investment horizons on prices and the reaction of investors to their
private signals (see Singleton (1987), Brown and Jennings (1989), Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein (1992), Dow and Gorton (1994), Vives (1995), Cespa (2002), Vives (2008), and
Albagli (2011)). If prices are semi-strong efficient (as in Vives (1995)), then traders do
not require compensation for increasing their exposure to the asset and so the inventory
component of the price impact disappears. As a consequence, the retrospective inference
loop breaks down and a unique equilibrium obtains. Brown and Jennings (1989) analyze
a model in which prices are not semi-strong efficient, investors have a short-term horizon,
and liquidity trading can be correlated. Their work provides a rationale for “techni-
cal analysis” that shows how, absent semi-strong efficiency, the sequence of transaction
prices is more informative—about the final payoff—than is the current stock price. We
argue that, in the absence of semi-strong efficiency, if liquidity trading is correlated then
second-period investors can retrospectively evaluate their first-period inferences. This
opportunity for reassessment generates strategic complementarities in the use of private
information and can also lead to multiple equilibria.
Other authors find that multiple equilibria can arise in the presence of short-term
traders. In this regard, part of the literature assumes an infinite horizon economy. Un-
der that assumption, multiplicity arises from the bootstrap nature of expectations in the
steady-state equilibrium of an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which investors
live for two periods. Spiegel (1998) studies the model with symmetric information.9
Watanabe (2008) extends the model of Spiegel (1998) to account for the possibility that
investors have heterogeneous short-lived private information.10 Other authors generate
multiple equilibria in finite-horizon economies. Zhang (2012) shows that short-term trad-
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ing generates multiple equilibria that can be ranked in terms of price informativeness.
However, multiplicity in that paper arises at the information acquisition stage, whereas
we find multiplicity in the response to private information. Furthermore, public informa-
tion in the LIE crowds out the production of private information, which is the opposite of
what happens in our case. Along similar lines, Avdis (2012) finds that short-term trading
can generate multiple equilibria in information acquisition. Finally, Chen, Huang, and
Zhang (2012) analyze a model with short-term trading and in which traders receive signals
of different precisions. These authors show that, even with transient liquidity trading,
multiple equilibria can arise in the response to private information. This is so because
the uncertainty reduction effect of an increase in the response to private information is
boosted by the dispersion of private precisions.11
The second stream of literature to which our paper relates is the work that addresses
the influence of higher-order expectations on asset prices (see Allen et al. (2006), Nimark
(2007), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2008), Kondor (2012)). Bacchetta and van Win-
coop (2006) study the role of HOEs in the foreign exchange market. They show that
such expectations worsen the signal extraction problem that investors face when observ-
ing exchange rate fluctuations that originate from trades based on hedging motives and
fundamentals information. In our setup this deterioration occurs at the LIE; at the HIE,
in contrast, investors’ strong reaction to private information makes signal extraction less
of a problem. Our results contrast with the implications of DO models (Kandel and
Pearson (1995), Banerjee (2011)) as we have stated in the introduction.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on limits to arbitrage. In that regard, our
multiplicity result is reminiscent of De Long et al. (1990), but in a model with rational
traders and a finite horizon. Thus, our paper naturally relates to the strand of this
literature that views limits to arbitrage as the analysis of how “non-fundamental demand
shocks” impact asset prices in models with rational agents (Gromb and Vayanos (2010),
Vayanos and Woolley (2013)), emphasizing the role of liquidity shocks persistence. Our
model also predicts that momentum is related to a high volume of informational trading,
which is in line with the evidence presented in Llorente et al. (2002). Some have claimed
that limits to arbitrage capital are responsible for crashes and meltdowns (see Duffie
(2010); see also Khandani and Lo (2011) for the August 2007 quant meltdown). In
our model, meltdowns can be explained in terms of a transition from the high- to the
low-information equilibrium.
8
II The static benchmark
Consider a one-period stock market in which a single risky asset (of liquidation value v)
and a riskless asset (of unitary return) are traded by a continuum of risk-averse, informed
investors in the interval [0, 1] and also by liquidity traders. We assume that v ∼ N(v¯, τ−1v ).
Investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences (we use γ to denote
the risk-tolerance coefficient) and maximize the expected utility of their wealth: Wi =
(v−p)xi.12 Before the market opens, each informed investor i obtains private information
on v, receiving a signal si = v + εi, εi ∼ N(0, τ−1ε ), and submits a demand schedule
(generalized limit order) X(si, p) to the market, indicating the investor’s desired position
in the risky asset for each realization of the equilibrium price.13 Assume that v and εi are
independent for all i and that error terms are also independent across investors. Liquidity
traders submit a random market order u (independent of all other random variables in the
model), where u ∼ N(0, τ−1u ). Finally, we adopt the convention that the average signal∫ 1
0
si di is equal to v almost surely. In other words, errors cancel out in the aggregate:∫ 1
0
εi di = 0.
14
In the CARA-normal framework just described, a symmetric rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) is a set of trades contingent on the information that investors have,
{X(si, p) for i ∈ [0, 1]}, and on a price functional P (v, u) (measurable in (v, u)) such that
investors in [0, 1] optimize (given their information) and the market clears:∫ 1
0
xi di+ u = 0.
Given this definition, it is easy to verify that a unique and symmetric equilibrium in
linear strategies exists in the class of equilibria with a price functional of the form P (v, u)
(see, e.g., Admati (1985), Vives (2008)). The equilibrium strategy of CARA investor i is
given by
X(si, p) = γ
E[v|si, p]− p
Var[v|si, p] .
Letting τ i ≡ (Var[v|si, p])−1 and denoting by αE = τ ε/τ i the optimal statistical (Bayesian)
weight given to private information in E[v|si, p], we have that γτ i = (a/αE), where
a = γτ ε, (1)
denotes the responsiveness to private information of investor i. Note that a is independent
of the variance of the price or of liquidity trading. This is because Var[v|si, p] cancels
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in the numerator and denominator of X(si, p). If market clearing is imposed then the
equilibrium price is given by
p =
∫ 1
0
Ei[v] di+
αE
a
u (2)
= E[v|p] + ΛE[u|p], (3)
where E[u|p] = a(v − E[v|p]) + u and
Λ =
Vari[v]
γ
. (4)
Equations (2) and (3) show that the price can be represented in two different ways. Ac-
cording to the representation in (2), the price reflects not only the consensus opinion
that investors hold about the liquidation value but also the effect of demand from liquid-
ity traders (multiplied by their risk tolerance–weighted uncertainty over the liquidation
value). Indeed, owing to CARA and normality, in a static market an investor’s demand is
proportional to the expected gains from trade, E[v|si, p]−p. Because the price aggregates
the demand of all investors, it reflects the consensus opinion
∫ 1
0
Ei[v] di that is shocked
by the orders of liquidity traders.
According to (3), the equilibrium price reflects investors’ estimates of the fundamen-
tals v (the so-called semi-strong efficient price E[v|p]) and of liquidity traders’ demand u;
risk-averse investors demand compensation for accommodating liquidity traders’ orders.
Under asymmetric information, that demand is not perfectly observable from the price.
Therefore, such compensation is increasing in an investor’s estimate E[u|p] scaled by Λ. It
follows from (4) that, for a given E[u|p], greater investor uncertainty about the liquidation
value or about the risk involved is associated with higher Λ and greater compensation.
Thus Λ captures the “inventory” component of market liquidity.15 Liquidity traders’
orders have an additional effect on the price through their impact on the semi-strong effi-
cient price E[v|p]. This effect induces an inference component that adds to the inventory
component, implying that the (reciprocal of) market liquidity can be written as
λ ≡ ∂p
∂u
= Λ + (1− αE)aτu
τ
,
where τ = 1/Var[v|p] = τ v + a2τu.16 We remark that, all else equal, in a static setup the
inference component magnifies the price impact of liquidity traders’ orders.
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III A two-period market with short-term investors
Consider now a two-period extension of the market analyzed in the previous section.
At date 1 (resp., 2), a continuum of short-term investors in the interval [0, 1] enters the
market, loads a position in the risky asset, and then unwinds that position in period 2
(resp., 3). Investor i has CARA preferences (we denote by γ the coefficient for common
risk tolerance) and maximizes the expected utility of her short-term profit piin = (pn+1−
pn)xin for n = 1, 2 with p0 = v¯ and p3 = v.
17 The short-term horizons of investors can be
justified on the grounds of incentive reasons related to performance evaluation or of the
difficulties associated with financing long-term investment when there are capital market
imperfections (see Holmstro¨m and Joan Ricart i Costa (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1990)). An investor i who enters the market in period 1 receives a signal si = v+εi that
she recalls in the second period, where εi ∼ N(0, τ−1ε ) and where v and εi are independent
for all i. We assume further that in the second period a signal sP = v + η is publicly
disclosed to the market, where η ∼ N(0, τ−1η ) is independent of both v and εi for all i. The
public signal introduces an additional source of public information on the fundamentals
(i.e., besides the equilibrium prices) whose informativeness is exogenous to the trading
process. The real-world counterpart of this assumption is any public announcement
about the asset’s value (e.g., an earnings announcement, analysts’ consensus forecast of
earnings). Once again we adopt the convention that, given v, the average private signal∫ 1
0
si di equals v almost surely and so errors cancel out in the aggregate:
∫ 1
0
εi di = 0.
We restrict our attention to equilibria in linear demand functions. We denote by
X1(si, p1) = a1si − ϕ1(p1) and X2(si, sP , p1, p2) = a2si + bsP − ϕ2(p1, p2) an investor’s
desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the equilibrium price at (respec-
tively) dates 1 and 2. The constants an and b denote, respectively, the weight an investor
gives to private information at date n and the weight she gives to the public signal. The
function ϕn(·) is a linear function of the equilibrium prices.18
The position of liquidity traders is assumed to follow a first-order autogressive or
AR(1) process:
θ1 = u1,
θ2 = βθ1 + u2;
(5)
here β ∈ [0, 1] and {u1, u2} is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
process (independent of all other random variables in the model) with un ∼ N(0, τ−1u ).
Other authors have adopted this assumption for liquidity traders, including Singleton
(1987), Campbell and Kyle (1993), He and Wang (1995), Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt
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(2010), and Cespa and Vives (2012). If β = 1, then {θ1, θ2} follows a random walk
and we are in the usual case of independent liquidity trade increments: u2 = θ2 − θ1 is
independent of u1 (Kyle (1985), Vives (1995)). If β = 0, then liquidity trading is i.i.d.
across periods; this is the case considered by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006).
Persistent liquidity trading is taken as a primitive of the model, but such trading
can be shown to arise endogenously in a model where liquidity traders are replaced by
rational hedgers with different investment horizons (see Cespa and Vives (2014)).19
Persistence in liquidity trading can be given several possible interpretations, depend-
ing on the frequency of observations. At a daily or intra-daily frequency, to assume
persistence is a simple way to capture the need of liquidity traders to break down a large
order into a series of smaller orders and thereby minimize price impact; as such, this as-
sumption is consistent with several empirical findings (e.g., Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu
(2003), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)). At a lower frequency, liquidity trading
persistence can be seen as a reduced-form assumption capturing the performance–flow
relationship’s effect on the holdings of mutual funds. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that
mutual funds faced with outflows (resp., inflows) engage in fire sales (resp., purchases),
creating contemporaneous, uninformed, and temporary negative (resp., positive) price
pressure.20 Coupling this result with the evidence that capital flows in and out of mutual
funds are strongly related to past performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and
Tufano (1998)), negative (resp., positive) shocks to the capital of mutual funds can affect
those funds’ trades and thus have a negative (resp., positive) effect on their performance
through feeding back to the funds’ capital outflows (resp., inflows). Overall, we see our
model as fit to describe the patterns that arise at a low frequency (monthly–quarterly).
Empirical evidence of liquidity trading persistence has been obtained in two ways.21
Campbell and Kyle (1993) disentangle the properties of the noise process from the prop-
erties of returns. These authors examine annual aggregate returns of index data in the
United States and then attempt to fit the properties of the time series with different mod-
els that feature noise. They find that, at a yearly level, noise traders’ positions are highly
persistent (from 95% to 97% of the noise remains after one year). An alternative strategy
is to look at the 13F filings of mutual funds that face negative or positive net inflows and
are thus led to trade for non-informational purposes (Coval and Stafford (2007)). This
is the approach taken by Lou (2012), who finds that mutual funds’ shareholdings display
strong persistence at a quarterly frequency.
We denote by Ei1[Y ] = E[Y |si, p1] and Vari1[Y ] = Var[Y |si, p1] the expectation and
variance of the random variable Y formed by a date-1 investor using private and public
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information; E1[Y ] = E[Y |p1] and Var1[Y ] = Var[Y |p1] denote the same case but when
only public information is used. Similar definitions for date-2 investors yield Ei2[Y ] =
E[Y |si, sP , p1, p2] and Vari2[Y ] = Var[Y |si, sP , p1, p2] as well as E2[Y ] = E[Y |sP , p1, p2]
and Var2[Y ] = Var[Y |sP , p1, p2]. The variables τn and τ in denote the precision of investor
forecasts of v based (respectively) only on public information and on both public and
private information; thus, τn = (1/Varn[v]) and τ in = (1/Varin[v]). Letting αEn = τ ε/τ in,
we have Ein[v] = αEnsin + (1− αEn)En[v].
We now derive the informational content of prices in a linear equilibrium. Consider a
candidate linear (symmetric) equilibrium where xi1 = a1si−ϕ1(p1) and xi2 = a2si+bsP−
ϕ2(p1, p2) for ϕn(·) a linear function. Denote by z1 ≡ a1v + θ1 the noisy informational
addition about v generated by informed investors in period 1 (i.e., the “informational
content” of the first-period order flow). Similarly, put ∆a2 ≡ a2 − βa1 and denote
investors’ second-period informational addition by z2 ≡ ∆a2v + u2. We now show that,
at a linear equilibrium, p1 is observationally equivalent (o.e.) to z1 and that, given sP , the
sequence {z1, z2} is o.e. to {p1, p2}. If we let xn ≡
∫ 1
0
xin di and impose market clearing
in the first period, then (by our convention) the implication is that
x1 + θ1 = 0 ⇐⇒ a1v + θ1 = ϕ1(p1). (6)
In the second period, the market-clearing condition is
x2 + βθ1 + u2 = 0 ⇐⇒ x2 − βx1 + u2 = 0
⇐⇒ a2v + bsP − ϕ2(p1, p2)− β(a1v − ϕ1(p1)) + u2 = 0
⇐⇒ ∆a2v + u2 = ϕ2(p1, p2)− βϕ1(p1)− bsP ; (7)
in the second line we have used (6), and by ∆a2 = a2 − βa1 we denote the β-weighted
net trading intensity of second-period informed investors. From (6) and (7) it is easy to
see that z1 is o.e. to p1 and that, given sP , {z1, z2} is o.e. to {p1, p2}. Hence E1[v] =
τ−11 (τ vv¯+a1τuz1), E2[v] = τ
−1
2 (τ 1E1[v]+τ ηsP +∆a2τuz2), Var1[v] ≡ τ−11 = (τ v+a21τu)−1,
Var2[v] ≡ τ−12 = (τ 1 + τ η + (∆a2)2 τu)−1, Ein[v] = τ−1in (τnEn[v] + τ εsi), and Varin[v] ≡
τ−1in = (τn + τ ε)
−1.
We shall now relate price formation to the Keynes’s notion of a Beauty Contest.
Then we look at the retrospective inference mechanism that we associate with persistent
liquidity trading and characterize equilibria, their stability properties, and trading strate-
gies. In this way we demonstrate the limits of the Beauty Contest analogy for financial
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markets. We end Section III with a robustness analysis.
A Prices and Beauty Contests
Here we give an expression for the equilibrium price that highlights the dependence of
that price on investors’ higher-order expectations about fundamentals (cf. Allen, Morris,
and Shin (2006)). When there is persistence, liquidity traders’ orders at time n also affect
the demand for the asset at time n+1. So in a two-period model, first-period investors use
their private information also to infer the demand of liquidity traders from the first-period
price. As a result, the latter is driven by investors’ HOEs about fundamentals and by
their average expectations about liquidity trading. This result, in turn, has implications
for the informational properties of the price.
Let us denote by E¯n[v] ≡
∫ 1
0
Ein[v] di the consensus opinion about the fundamentals
at time n, where E¯n[v] = αEnv + (1 − αEn)En[v]. Starting from the second period,
if we impose market clearing then
∫ 1
0
X2(si, sP , p1, p2) di + θ2 = 0. Because of CARA
and normality, we have X2(si, sP , p1, p2) = γVari2[v]
−1(Ei2[v] − p2). Substituting this
expression into the market-clearing equation and solving for the equilibrium price now
yields
p2 = E¯2[v] +
Vari2[v]
γ
θ2. (8)
Similarly, imposing market clearing in the first period we have
∫ 1
0
X1(si, p1) di + θ1 = 0;
solving for the equilibrium price then yields
p1 = E¯1[p2] +
Vari1[p2]
γ
θ1. (9)
Substituting (8) and then rearranging, we obtain
p1 = E¯1
[
E¯2[v] +
Vari2[v]
γ
θ2
]
+
Vari1[p2]
γ
θ1
= E¯1[E¯2[v]] + β
Vari2[v]
γ
E¯1[θ1] +
Vari1[p2]
γ
θ1. (10)
According to (10), three terms constitute the first-period price: investors’ second-order
average expectations over the liquidation value (E¯1[E¯2[v]]), the risk-adjusted effect of the
first-period stock of liquidity trades (θ1), and investors’ average expectations over first-
period liquidity trades (E¯1[θ1]). Those latter expectations arise because p2 depends on
θ2, which in turn is correlated with θ1 when β > 0. Thus, investors in period 1 are also
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interested in estimating θ1.
Expression (10) implies that, because of persistence in liquidity trading, the weight
of the price on investors’ average information is the sum of two terms. The first term
captures the effect of HOEs on v, and the second reflects the effect of investors’ average
expectations concerning θ1. We have that
E¯1[E¯2[v]] = α¯E1v + (1− α¯E1)E1[v];
E¯1[θ1] = a1(1− αE1)(v − E1[v]) + θ1.
Here α¯E1 = αE1(1 − (τ 1/τ 2)(1 − αE2)), and a1 denotes first-period investors’ average
responsiveness to private information.22 So given (10), the implication is that the total
weight of the price on average private information is given by
αP1 = α¯E1 + β
Vari2[v]
γ
a1(1− αE1). (11)
Observe that α¯E1 < αE1 for any β. Therefore, if liquidity trading is transient (β =
0) then the first-period price places more weight on public information than does the
optimal statistical weight. This finding is in line with Allen et al. (2006), who prove
that if information is heterogeneous then prices reflect investors’ HOEs about the final
payoff. In this case, the law of iterated expectations does not hold and investors’ forecasts
overweight public information (in the sense that αP1 = α¯E1 < αE1). The reason is
that investors anticipate the average market opinion while knowing that this opinion
depends also on the public information observed by other investors. In Section III.E
we show that the price is then systematically farther away (than the consensus) from
fundamentals. If liquidity trading is persistent, however, then p1 also reflects investors’
average expectations about θ1. Hence another term is added to α¯E1 in the expression for
αP1 given by (11). We argue in Section III.E that this additional term can reverse the
conclusion we derived under transient liquidity trading.
B Retrospective inference and equilibrium prices
We start by giving a general description of the equilibrium price function providing
three equivalent expressions for prices that highlight different properties of the model.
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PROPOSITION 1: At a linear equilibrium, the price is given by
pn = αPn
(
v +
θn
an
)
+ (1− αPn)En[v], (12)
where θn = un + βθn−1 and where an and αPn denote the responsiveness to private in-
formation exhibited at period n by investors and by the price, respectively (see equations
(A.3a), (A.3b), (A.8), and (A.9)). We have that αP2 = αE2 < 1.
According to (12), at period n the equilibrium price is a weighted average of the market
expectation about the fundamentals v (the semi-strong efficient price) and a noisy market
signal about v that depends on the response to private information. Rearranging this
expression yields
pn − En[v] = αPn
an
(an(v − En[v]) + θn)
= ΛnEn[θn] (13)
for Λn ≡ αPn/an, which implies that there is a discrepancy between pn and En[v]. As in
the static market (see (3)), this discrepancy reflects a premium that is proportional to
the expected stock of liquidity trading that investors accommodate at date n. The result
is our second equilibrium price expression as follows.
COROLLARY 1.1: At a linear equilibrium, the price incorporates a premium above the
semi-strong efficient price:
pn = En[v] + ΛnEn[θn], (14)
where Λ2 = Vari2[v]/γ and
Λ1 =
Vari1[p2]
γ
+ βΛ2. (15)
A comparison of (15) with (4) reveals that short-term trading affects the inventory
component of liquidity. In a static market, investors who absorb the demand of liquidity
traders are exposed to risk stemming from the randomness of v. In a dynamic market,
however, short-term investors at date 1 face the risk due to the randomness of the next-
period price (i.e., the price at which they unwind). To the extent that liquidity trading
displays persistence, informed second-period investors absorb part of the first-period liq-
uidity traders’ positions; this dynamic contributes to first-period investors’ uncertainty
about p2, yielding (15).
We can use (14) to show that, as in the static benchmark, under asymmetric informa-
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tion the price is affected not only by the inventory component Λn but also by an inference
component. This claim is formalized in our next corollary.
COROLLARY 1.2: Let a0 = 0. At a linear equilibrium,
p1 = λ1z1 + (1− λ1a1)v¯ and (16a)
p2 = λ2z2 +
τ η
τ i2
sP +
γτ 1E1[v] + βz1
γτ i2
. (16b)
Here λn denotes the price impact of trades in period n = 1, 2:
λn ≡ ∂pn
∂un
=
αPn
an
+ (1− αPn)
∆anτu
τn
. (17)
According to (17), the inference component of liquidity at n = 2 is captured by
(1− αP2)
∆a2τu
τ 2
. (18)
As shown in (7), a dynamic market differs from the static benchmark in that the sign
of this component depends on the β-weighted net position of informed investors; thus
the net trading intensity ∆a2 = a2 − βa1. As a result, the effect of private information
in the second period depends on the change in informed investors’ positions, where this
change is measured by ∆a2 = a2 − βa1. The implication is that the sign of the inference
component depends on the magnitude of a1 as compared with a2/β.
23 Therefore, the first-
period response to private information affects the informational innovation extracted from
p1 and also (when β > 0) the one extracted from p2—that is, both z1 and z2—as well as
the sign of the inference component in λ2.
When β > 0 the door is open to a negative inference component in the second period
when a1 is large since in this period investors retrospectively reassess the first period
inference about the fundamentals based on the new evidence gathered. Suppose that
second-period informed investors observe high demand for the asset (i.e., z2 high). If a1
is large then the first-period price is quite informative about v (since z1 = a1v + θ1).
Hence (i) most of the price adjustment to fundamentals information must have occurred
in the first period and (ii) demand is likely to be driven by liquidity trading. Since
β > 0, it follows that high demand for the asset from liquidity traders also affected the
first-period aggregate demand. But for a given price realization p1, that would imply a
lower expectation of the fundamentals.24 Indeed, if a1 is so large that ∆a2 < 0, then a
17
large aggregate demand realization leads second-period investors to revise downward their
expectations of the liquidation value because a large z2 = ∆a2v + u2 is bad news about
v when ∆a2 < 0. In this case the inference component in λ2 is negative and offsets the
inventory component. If instead a1 is small, the first period price is poorly informative
about v, and a second period large realization z2 is more likely to come from informed
investors. For β > 0 this reinforces the belief that low liquidity traders’ demand affected
the first period demand for the asset and, for a given price realization p1, implies a higher
expectation of the fundamentals (since ∆a2 > 0). In this case, the inference component
is positive and adds to the inventory component, increasing λ2.
In summary, when liquidity trading displays persistence, second period investors can
retrospectively reassess the first period inference about the fundamentals, based on the
new evidence gathered in the second period, affecting the inference component of second
period price impact of trade (λ2). We thus term this effect “retrospective inference”.
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C Equilibrium characterization
Short horizons create a dependence of a1 on the residual variance of p2 given p1,
generating an uncertainty reduction effect when a1 increases. The reason is that short-
term investors in the first period trade according to
X1(si, p1) = γ
Ei1[p2]− p1
Vari1[p2]
=⇒ a1 = γWeight to si in Ei1[p2]
Vari1[p2]
. (19)
By this implication, a1 is directly related to the relevance of the private signal to forecast
p2 and inversely related to investors’ uncertainty about p2. Two effects are present that,
contrary to the static case, do not cancel each other. On the one hand, we have the usual
substitution effect whereby a higher average a1 leads to a more informative price in period
1 (higher τ 1 and τ i1), and therefore a lower weight to private information τ /τ i1 in Ei1[p2],
which tends to depress a1. On the other hand, a higher average a1 and larger τ 1 leads
to a lower Vari1[p2], which tends to raise a1. This is a source of strategic complementary
in the responses to private information. With short-horizons, this uncertainty reduction
effect also works through λ2. This is because, first period investors are interested in
forecasting p2 and, for any public signal, the extent to which p2 differs from p1 depends
on λ2 (see (16b)). Therefore, a higher λ2 (in absolute value) will, ceteris paribus, increase
first-period investors’ uncertainty about p2 and depress a1. Recall that when β > 0 it is
possible that ∆a2 < 0 when a1 is high enough, implying that the inference component in
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λ2 offsets the inventory component. In this case, the second-period price impact of trade
is small, which diminishes first-period investors’ uncertainty about p2 and so boosts their
response to private signals. Hence, the variance reduction (second) effect dominates the
substitution (first) effect and a high level of a1 can be sustained in equilibrium. At the
same time, a lower level of a1 is also self-fulfilling. Indeed, a low a1 generates a low τ 1
and a high residual variance for p2 given p1 which makes the low a1 self-fulfilling. In this
case we have ∆a2 > 0 (even if β > 0) and the second period price impact of trade (λ2) is
high, augmenting the residual variance of p2.
Summarizing, investors’ willingness to speculate on private information not only de-
pends on their uncertainty about the liquidation price, but also affects that uncertainty.
This two-sided loop in the determination of a1 gives rise to strategic complementarities
in the use of private information, which can yield multiple equilibria. The following
proposition characterizes linear equilibria and provides suffcient conditions for multiple
equilibria to exist. Those conditions imply that the variance reduction effect is strong
enough.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose τ η > 0.
• If β > 1/2, γ2τ ετu > 2(2β − 1)/(3− 2β), and τ η ≤ τˆ η (for some τˆ η > 0 defined in
the appendix, see (A.13c)), there always exist at least three linear equilibria where
a2 = γτ ε and a1 ∈ {a∗1, a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }, with a∗1 ∈ (0, a2),
a∗∗1 ∈
(
1 + γτua2
γβτu
,
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
)
, a∗∗∗1 >
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
,
implying a∗1 < a2 < a
∗∗
1 < a
∗∗∗
1 . When
a1 =
 a
∗
1, then a2 − βa∗1 > 0, and λ∗2 > 0,
a∗∗1 , a
∗∗∗
1 , then a2 − βa∗∗1 < 0, and λ∗∗2 < 0.
(20)
Along these equilibria:
τ ∗n < τ
∗∗
n < τ
∗∗∗
n , n = 1, 2. (21)
• If β = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium with a2 = γτ ε,
γ2a2τu(a
2
2τu + τ ε + τ η)
1 + γ2τu(a22τu + 2τ ε + τ η)
< a∗1 < a2,
and λ∗2 > 0.
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According to this proposition, multiplicity requires that private information be strongly
reflected in prices (γ2τ ετu > 2 is sufficient), persistence (β) is high, and public precision
(τ η) is low. All of these conditions strengthen the retrospective inference and the de-
scribed uncertainty reduction effect loop. A contrario, for example, a higher precision of
the public signal makes p2 more dependent on sP and less on p1 and therefore the impact
of τ 1 on the residual variance of p2 is lessened.
In view of (21), we refer to the three equilibria described in Proposition 1 as (respec-
tively) the low-, intermediate-, and high-information equilibrium: LIE, IIE, and HIE. In
the Appendix we show that first-period equilibrium responsiveness is obtained as a fixed
point of the following function:
ψ(a1) = γ
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)αE1
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)2/τ i1 + λ
2
2/τu + τ η/τ
2
i2
. (22)
Numerical analysis shows that this function crosses the 45-degree line at most three
times, which suggests that the three equilibria described in Proposition 2 are the only ones
that can arise (see Figure 1). Our numerical results show further that these equilibria can
be ranked in terms of second-period price impact (λ2), inventory component of liquidity
(Λn), and conditional volatility (Var1[p2]). The following result gives more details.
[Figure 1 about here.]
NUMERICAL RESULT 1: When multiple equilibria arise, these inequalities hold:
λ∗2 > |λ∗∗2 | > |λ∗∗∗2 |; (23a)
Λ∗n > Λ
∗∗
n > Λ
∗∗∗
n ; (23b)
Var1[p2]
∗ > Var1[p2]∗∗ > Var1[p2]∗∗∗. (23c)
Along the HIE, ∆a2 < 0 and the inference component of liquidity is negative. This
finding is consistent with second-period traders revising downward their first-period as-
sessment of the payoff in the presence of a positive demand shock (i.e., engaging in
retrospective inference). This result is consistent also with the findings of some spread
decomposition models (e.g., Huang and Stoll (1997), Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr
(2001), Henker and Wang (2006)) in which the adverse selection component of the spread
can be negative.26 Thus, our model provides a theoretical justification for this empirical
finding.
20
In Figure 2 we display the effects of a change in the values of public and private signal
precision, persistence, and liquidity traders’ demand precision on the best response (22).27
As the graphs show, uniqueness always occurs at the LIE and requires high public pre-
cision or low private precision, persistence, or liquidity traders’ precision. Intuitively,
in all of these cases the endogenous public signal (the price) becomes relatively less in-
formative than the exogenous public signal (sP ), leading second-period investors to rely
less on price information. This dynamic weakens strategic complementarity by softening
the self-reinforcing uncertainty reduction loop resulting from retrospective inference and
thereby yields a unique equilibrium. It is worth noting that it can be checked that the
best response ψ(·) is downward sloping when β = 0.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Figure 3 we show that the effect of an increase in public signal precision on a1
depends on the equilibrium that arises. Along the HIE (resp., LIE), a larger τ η leads to
a decrease (resp., increase) in a1. The reason for this result is that a more precise public
signal reduces traders’ reliance on price information when forecasting the fundamentals.
Thus, along both equilibria, the effect of retrospective inference is weaker in the second
period. In the HIE (LIE) this weakened effect increases (decreases) first-period investors’
uncertainty about p2, leading to a decrease (increase) in a1.
28
If the public signal is totally uninformative then, for β > 0, the retrospective inference
and variance reduction loop becomes extremely strong. In this case, the best response (22)
becomes discontinuous at the IIE (which therefore disappears; see Figure 3) and so we
always obtain two equilibria that can be computed in closed form. This claim is formalized
in our next corollary.
[Figure 3 about here.]
COROLLARY 2.1: Suppose τ η = 0.
• If β > 0 then there always exist two linear equilibria, where a2 = γτ ε and a1 ∈
{a∗1, a∗∗∗1 } for a∗1 < a2 < a∗∗∗1 (see (A.17) and (A.18) for explicit expressions). If
a1 =
a∗1 then a2 − βa∗1 > 0 and λ
∗
2 > 0 (LIE),
a∗∗∗1 then a2 − βa∗∗∗1 < 0 and λ∗∗∗2 < 0 (HIE).
Furthermore, |λ∗∗∗2 | < λ∗2, Λ∗∗∗n < Λ∗n, prices are more informative, and Var1[p2] is
lower along the HIE.
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• If β = 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium with a2 = γτ ε and
a∗1 =
γa22τu
1 + γa2τu
< a2.
REMARK 1: It is possible to show (as in Vives (1995)) that a unique equilibrium arises
when prices are set by a sector of competitive and risk-neutral market makers. In this
case the market makers do not require compensation (for inventory risk) in order to clear
the market, and prices are semi-strong efficient. The uncertainty reduction effect of an
increase in a1 is present when β > 0 but weakened, which ensures uniqueness.
29 It is also
possible to show that the equilibrium is unique when investors have no private information
(τ ε = 0). In this case our model is akin to Grossman and Miller (1988) and investors
trade only to accommodate liquidity traders’ orders. Prices are therefore invertible in
the latter’s demand and retrospective inference does not arise, with price informativeness
depending only on prior precsion.
REMARK 2: We can draw a parallel between our model and models in which investor
actions have a feedback effect on the asset’s value. In papers that feature such models (e.g.,
Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008), Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), Dow, Goldstein,
and Guembel (2011), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013)), complementarities-driven
multiplicity of equilibria arises also from the effect of the price on the asset’s value. In
our paper, the price at n = 2 (i.e., p2) represents the asset’s value from the perspective
of investors at n = 1, and their trading also affects p2. This dynamic corresponds to the
feedback effect from prices to values in a one-period feedback model. Bond et al. (2010)
show that, if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions (as when the
board considers firing the CEO in response to a low stock price), then prices adjust to
reflect this use and may thus become less revealing. In Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008),
prices are informative about both the fundamentals and the likelihood of coordination
among informed investors. Multiple equilibria arise when the price is more informative
of the coordination motive than of the fundamentals. In their paper, the feedback effect’s
strength depends on the sensitivity of asset value to investment in the risky asset. The
parallel in our model is the degree of persistence in liquidity trading. In both models,
multiplicity tends to arise when the feedback effect is strong. Much as in our model, in
Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) there are multiple equilibria also when the precision of private
information is high and base liquidity trading low. Yet unlike their study, in which an
increase in public precision leads to a higher coordination motive and multiple equilibria,
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our model (with no coordination motive) yields the opposite result.
D Stability
In this section we use the best response (22) to perform a stability analysis of the
equilibria. Toward that end, consider the following argument. Assume that the market is
at an equilibrium point a¯1 and so a¯1 = ψ(a¯1). Suppose now that a small perturbation to
a¯1 occurs. As a consequence, first-period investors modify the weight they give to private
information; then the aggregate weight becomes a¯′1 = ψ(a¯
′
1). If the market returns
to the original a¯1 then—according to the best-reply dynamics with the best-response
function ψ(·)—the equilibrium is stable; otherwise, it is unstable. Hence we can say
that, in a stable (unstable) equilibrium, if investors other than i put a lower weight
on their signals then (i) the price is noisier and (ii) investor i reacts by increasing less
(more) than proportionally the weight on his own signal and so contributing less (more)
than proportionally to restoring price informativeness. Formally, we have the following
definition.
DEFINITION 1 (Stability): An equilibrium is stable (unstable) if and only if its cor-
responding value for a1 is a stable (unstable) fixed point for the best-response function
ψ(·)—that is, iff its corresponding value for a1 satisfies the inequality |ψ′(a1)| < 1.
For τ η > 0, if multiple equilbria arise then the IIE is always unstable.
30 On the
contrary, in our simulations the LIE is always stable. Finally, the behavior of the HIE is
more complex. In particular, for the HIE to be stable we require that private signals not
be “too” precise when compared with the public signal. In the extreme case when τ η = 0,
we can formally analyze the best-response mapping and obtain the following result.
COROLLARY 2.2: Suppose τ η = 0. Then (i) ψ
′(a1) < 0 and (ii) the LIE (resp., HIE) is
stable (resp., unstable) with respect to the best-response dynamics:
|ψ′(a∗∗∗1 )| > 1 > |ψ′(a∗1)| . (24)
Intuitively, if private information is much more precise than public information then
the retrospective inference and the variance reduction loop become very strong. In that
case we approach a situation close to that described in Corollary 2.1, which makes the
HIE always unstable.
In Figure 4 we set β = 1, γ = 1/2, and τu = τ v = 10; we also partition the parameter
space {τ ε × τ η | τ η ∈ {0, .01, . . . , 10}, τ ε ∈ {.01, .02, . . . , 10}} into five regions depending
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on whether multiple equilibria or instead a unique equilibrium obtains, whether the HIE is
stable, and whether responses to private information are strategic substitutes or strategic
complements.31
[Figure 4 about here.]
REMARK 3: What is the effect of a shock to parameter values on the market’s equilib-
rium? The answer to this question depends on whether or not the HIE is stable (see the
Online Appendix). When the HIE is stable we can easily generate non-monotonic effects
of exogenous parameter changes (e.g., in private signal precision or in risk tolerance)
on the response to private information, the conditional volatility of returns, and the in-
formational efficiency of prices. These results are possible because a parameter change
may induce traders to coordinate at a different equilibrium. For instance, it is possible
that a large decrease in private signal precision produces an increase in the equilibrium
response to private information and informational efficiency—as well as a decline in the
conditional volatility of returns, with the equilibrium shifting from the initial LIE to the
HIE. When the HIE is unstable, numerical simulations show that the effect of even a mild
shock to parameter values depends on how persistent the demand of liquidity traders is.
When β ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium converges to the LIE; when β = 1, the market oscillates
between two nonequilibrium values.
E Equilibrium strategies and limits of the Beauty Contest analogy
We characterize first investors’ strategies.
COROLLARY 2.3: At a linear equilibrium, the strategies of an informed investor are
given by
X1(si, p1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) + αP1 − αE1
αE1
E1[θ1], (25)
X2(si, sP , p1, p2) =
a2
αE2
(Ei2[v]− p2). (26)
In the event of multiple equilibria, if
a1 =
a∗1 then αP1 < αE1 , (∂xi2/∂p2) < 0, Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] < 0;a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 then αP1 > αE1 , (∂xi2/∂p2) > 0, Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] > 0. (27)
If β = 0 then αP1 < αE1 , (∂xi2/∂p2) < 0, and Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] < 0.
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According to (26), in the second period an investor behaves as if he were in a static
market. So in the first period this investor loads his position while anticipating the second-
period price and scaling it down according to his uncertainty regarding p2 (see (19)). In
this case, the investor’s strategy can be expressed as the sum of two components (see (25)).
The first component captures the investor’s activity based on his private estimation of
the difference between the fundamentals and the equilibrium price. Such activity is akin
to “long-term” speculative trading that aims to take advantage of the investor’s superior
information on the asset’s liquidation value (since p2 is correlated with v). The second
component captures the investor’s activity based on the extraction of public information
(i.e., order flow). This trading instead aims to time the market by exploiting short-run
movements in the asset price related to the evolution of aggregate demand.
Along the HIE, the price is closer to fundamentals. As a result, when observing
E1[θ1] = a1(v − E1[v]) + θ1 > 0
the investor infers that this realization is mainly driven by fundamentals information; he
therefore goes long in the asset, “chasing the trend”. This behavior reflects his anticipa-
tion that second-period investors will bid the price up when he unwinds his position, as
implied by the sign of Covi1[v−p2, p2−p1]. Along the “Keynesian” LIE, prices are driven
more by liquidity trading and so the trader acts instead as a “contrarian” investor.
This observation also suggests that the aggregate trading behavior of informed in-
vestors differs across the two equilibria. In the LIE, investors trade less aggressively
on private information and thus exploit more aggressively the predictability of liquidity
traders’ demand. The opposite occurs in the HIE, where aggregate demand is driven by
trading that is relatively more informed. We can demonstrate these claims formally by
evaluating informed investors’ first-period aggregate position
∫ 1
0
X1(si, p1) di = X1(v, p1),
X1(v, p1) =
a1
αE1
(E¯1[v]− p1) + αP1 − αE1
αE1
E1[θ1], (28)
and then computing the following covariances:
Cov
[
a1
αE1
(E¯1[v]− p1), θ1
]
= −
(
a21
τ 1
+
αP1
αE1
τ v
τ 1τu
)
< 0 (29a)
Cov
[
αP1 − αE1
αE1
E1[θ1], θ1
]
=
αP1 − αE1
αE1
τ v
τ 1τu
 < 0 LIE> 0 HIE (29b)
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The aggregate long-term speculative position is always negatively correlated with the
noise shock (see (29a)). For the short-term aggregate position, this correlation is observed
only in the LIE (see (29b)). In other words, for a given noise shock realization, investors in
the HIE speculate against it according to the long-term component of their strategy while
apparently trading along with it according to the short-term component. The intuition
is that, along the HIE, investors trade so aggressively on their private information that
they more than offset the initial price deviation from fundamentals generated by θ1. For
example, if θ1 > 0 then investors short the stock so aggressively that its price undershoots
the fundamentals.32 In equilibrium, then, investors find it profitable to purchase shares
based on order flow information. Along the LIE, investors trade less aggressively on
private information and so the covariances of both the long- and short-term components
of investors’ demand with liquidity traders’ demand have concordant signs.
REMARK 4: It is interesting that, along the HIE, the asset is a Giffen good in the second
period (see (27)). Differentiating xi2 with respect to p2, we can break down the effect of
a price increase into a substitution effect and an “information” effect:
∂X2(si, sP , p1, p2)
∂p2
=
a2
αE2
 ∂Ei2[v]∂p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information effect
− 1︸︷︷︸
Substitution effect
 . (30)
Along the HIE, investors rely strongly on prices, which are extremely informative about
liquidation value. In this case, the substitution effect is swamped by the information
effect.33 Along the LIE, the opposite happens and the asset is a normal good in the second
period.34 Giffen goods often arise when the learning from uninformed investors prevails,
in which case the aggregate information effect dominates the substitution effect (see, e.g.,
Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), Yuan (2005), Vives (2008)). This could happen also in the
presence of feedback effects when prices are informative both about the fundamentals and
about the likelihood of coordination among informed investors, since the feedback effect
would then strengthen the information effect (as in Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008)).
Our last result in this section relates the two equilibria to the reliance of price on
public information.
COROLLARY 2.4: Suppose τ η > 0.
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1. Let β ∈ (0, 1], and assume there are multiple equilibria. In that case, if
a1 =
a∗1 then αP1 < αE1 and Cov[p1, v] < Cov[E¯1[v], v],a∗∗∗1 then αP1 > αE1 and Cov[p1, v] > Cov[E¯1[v], v].
2. If β = 0, then αP1 < αE1 and Cov[p1, v] < Cov[E¯1[v], v].
If liquidity trading is persistent then, along the HIE, investors escalate their response
to private information. In this case the extra weight added to α¯E1 (see (11)) is large
enough to draw the price closer to fundamentals (than is the consensus), in contrast with
Allen et al. (2006). In view of the results obtained in Section III.D, this equilibrium is
stable provided that private information is not too much more precise than the exogenous
public signal. Along the LIE, the price is farther away from fundamentals compared to
consensus. This equilibrium, which shares the same properties of the one found by Allen
et al. (2006), is always stable.
REMARK 5: According to Numerical Result 1 and Corollary 2.1, the inventory com-
ponent of liquidity is larger in the LIE than in the HIE. That difference suggests an
alternative interpretation of Corollary 2.4: When prices are farther away from (resp.,
closer to) fundamentals as compared with the consensus, inventory risk is high (resp.,
low). From an empirical standpoint, the implication is that the inventory component of
liquidity is increasing in the extent of the difference between how accurately fundamentals
are assessed by asset prices versus the consensus.
F Robustness
In this section we perform some robustness exercises. First, we extend our model
to encompass the possibility that residual uncertainty affects the asset payoff. Second,
we show that a very similar pattern of equilibrium multiplicity arises in a model with
long-term traders who face residual uncertainty about the final payoff. (Our analysis of
both these extensions is given in the Online Appendix.) Finally, we discuss the effect of
extending the number of trading rounds and allowing investors to receive more than one
private signal.
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F.1 The effect of residual uncertainty
Assume that investors face residual uncertainty over the final liquidation value. That
final payoff is written as vˆ = v+δ, where δ ∼ N(0, τ−1δ ) is a random term orthogonal to all
random variables in the market and about which no investor is informed. Our inclusion of
the random term δ allows one to study the effect of an increase in the residual uncertainty
that characterizes the investing environment in periods of heightened turbulence. It is
intuitive that, when investors face residual uncertainty, they put less weight on their
own signals because prices and private information are less useful in predicting the asset
payoff. This dynamic is likely to weaken the retrospective inference and variance reduction
loop and may even eliminate the HIE. Yet our analysis shows that, in general, residual
uncertainty neither eliminates the HIE nor makes it unstable.
Even when there is residual uncertainty, the expressions for prices and investors’
strategies do not change (i.e., the expressions (14), (25), and (26) still hold). However,
the equilibrium obtains as the solution of a system of two highly nonlinear equations and
is therefore more difficult to solve. Numerical analysis establishes that: (i) an equilibrium
akin to the LIE always arises; (ii) for low values of 1/τ δ there can be as many as five
equilibria, and at least one of these will be a HIE; (iii) if residual uncertainty is high
then a unique equilibrium obtains and only LIE-type equilibria survive. In our baseline
simulation, we set τ v = 1 and find that, for τ δ < 40, the HIE vanishes. Although at first
blush a small level of residual uncertainty (e.g., σ2δ ≤ 1/40) may seem to cast doubt on the
HIE’s relevance, it is possible to show that this parameterization is in line with calibrated
asset pricing models. For instance, Wang (1994) models the asset payoff as a dividend
process Ft+1 = ρFt + ωt+1, where Ft is a persistent component and ωt+1 an orthogonal
random error term that corresponds to our residual uncertainty term. Here the coefficient
ρ parameterizes the effect of past fundamentals on current ones. In this framework, the
fraction of variance coming from residual uncertainty is 1 − ρ2 (i.e., the ratio of σ2ω to
the steady-state variance of Ft+1 or σ
2
ω/(1 − ρ2)), which in our framework corresponds
to σ2δ/(σ
2
δ + σ
2
v). It is easy to show that, for ρ ∈ (.98, .99), residual uncertainty in the
dynamic model is of comparable importance to that implied by the parameter τ δ = 40. So
if, for example, we take our model to represent trading patterns that occur at a quarterly
frequency, then the previous statement implies (roughly) a critical value of ρ = .95 at a
yearly frequency; that value is commonly used for calibration in asset pricing models.35
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F.2 Long-term investors
Consider again the market with residual uncertainty, but now suppose that investors
have a long horizon and so maximize the expected utility of their final wealth. For
simplicity we will address the case in which the public signal is useless (τ η = 0). We find
that multiple equilibria are possible in this scenario as well, and the reasons are similar
to those given for the case of short-term investors.
A long-term investor in the first period speculates on short-term returns and takes
into account the hedging possibilities of second-period trading. The equilibrium strategy
of investor i in the first period is actually a linear combination of (Ei1[p2]−p1) and Ei1[xi2]
(Cespa and Vives (2012)).36 If traders do not expect prices to change, then their optimal
period-1 position would be just as in a static market. The risk of holding such a position
would be due only to the liquidation value’s unpredictability.37
However, if a change in prices is expected then traders optimally exploit short-run
price differences. Two factors increase the risk of their period-1 position: the partial
unpredictability of the price change; and the impossibility of determining their exact
future position. Nevertheless, the opportunity to trade again in the future does serve
as a hedge against potentially adverse price movements. In equilibrium, this option
reduces risk and thereby—in the absence of residual uncertainty—exactly offsets the
price risk conditional on private information. So when there is no residual uncertainty,
traders’ strategies incorporate static responses to private information and there is a unique
equilibrium. In this case, the optimal strategy of an informed trader is static (i.e., buy
and hold): in the first period, informed traders receive their private signal and take a
position; in the second period, there is no informed trading. Although investors may
nonetheless speculate on price differences, they do so only for market-making purposes
(i.e., to profit from the mean reversion of liquidity trading). When there is residual
uncertainty, investors in the second period scale down their trading activity as the final
payoff becomes harder to forecast. This weakens the hedging effect of the re-trading
opportunity and renders strategies truly dynamic, leading investors to speculate on short-
term price movements based on their private information.38 These consequences reinforce
the retrospective inference and variance reduction loop and lead to multiple equilibria,
since the market’s liquidity in the second period strongly affects a trader’s reaction to
private information in the first period.
In summary, with long-term and risk-averse investors there may be multiple equilibria
when there is either residual uncertainty (He and Wang (1995), Cespa and Vives (2012))
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or a common shock to private signals (Grundy and McNichols (1989)). We may have
situations then with a negative price impact in the second period. This arises because in
those cases informed traders have incentives to use their private information to speculate
on short-term price movements and long-term traders may behave as short-term ones.
F.3 More private signals, more trading rounds
The model can be extended to encompass the possibility that investors trade for
more than two periods and/or receive additional private signals during each round of
trading. However, the analysis becomes more complicated without any effect on the
qualitative results. In particular, we can still show that multiple equilibria (with the
stated properties) arise provided β > 0.
IV Asset pricing implications
In this section we investigate the asset pricing implications of our analysis. First, we
show that liquidity trading persistence can generate positive autocovariance of returns
irrespective of whether beliefs are heterogeneous (as in Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer
(2009)) or whether investors’ preferences exhibit a behavioral bias (as in Daniel, Hir-
shleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Second, we look at the expected volume of in-
formational trading and then compare the model’s predicitons with predictions under
“differences of opinion” models. Third, we discuss identification problems in models with
multiple equilibria and derive a set of empirical implications that allow one to distinguish
the HIE from the LIE. Finally, we show how our model can provide a narrative of some
episodes related to the recent financial crisis.
A Return autocovariance
We start by computing the return autocovariance at different horizons.
COROLLARY 2.5: Suppose τ η > 0. At equilibrium, the following statements hold.
(i) For all β ∈ [0, 1], Cov[p2 − p1, p1 − v¯] < 0.
(ii) For β ∈ (0, 1], Cov[v − p2, p1 − v¯] < 0; for β = 0, Cov[v − p2, p1 − v¯] = 0.
(iii) For β ∈ (0, 1], if there are multiple equilibria then—along the HIE—we have Cov[v−
p2, p2 − p1] > 0. If β = 0, then Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] < 0.
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This result states that, along the HIE, momentum always occurs at short horizons
(i.e., near the end of the trading horizon) whereas the reversal of returns occurs at long
horizons.39
Parts (i) and (ii) of the corollary hold because a given estimated first-period imbalance
E1[θ1] has the opposite effect on p1−v¯ as it does on both p2−p1 and v−p2.40 For part (iii),
a covariance decomposition (and the normality of returns) yields:
Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1]
= Cov[E1[v − p2], E1[p2 − p1]] + Cov1[v − p2, p2 − p1]
= βΛ2
Vari1[p2]
γ
Var[E1[θ1]] +
(1 + γτu∆a2)(βa1∆a2τu − τ 1) + γτ ητuβa1
(γτ i2)2τ 1τu
.
(31)
The first term in this decomposition captures the covariation in forecasts of conditional
returns, E1[v−p2] and E1[p2−p1]—in other words, the covariance “explained” by p1. The
second term captures the conditional covariation of returns, the “residual” covariance. All
else equal, if trading is persistent then the anticipated effect of the first-period imbalance
on the second- and third-period expected returns is of the same sign; hence the first term
is always positive when β > 0. Suppose that investors in the first period estimate a
selling pressure from liquidity traders. If p1 < p2 then the outcome p2 < v is more likely
than is p2 ≥ v because liquidity traders’ sales of the asset are likely to persist in the
second period.41 For the second term, factoring out the effect of first-period information
suggests that the joint covariation of returns around their expectations could be driven
either by liquidity trading or by fundamentals information. In the HIE, prices are driven
by informed traders; hence the second effect predominates and there is positive covariance
of returns around their means.42 Conversely, prices in the LIE are more driven by liquidity
trades and so returns tend to covary around their means in opposite directions.
When τ η = 0, all of the results obtained in Corollary 2.5 continue to hold. We can
also prove that, for β sufficiently high, momentum occurs at short horizons also along the
LIE (numerical simulations confirm this result for the case τ η > 0). Formally, we have
the following statement.
COROLLARY 2.6: Suppose τ η = 0. Then, along the LIE, for τ v < τˆ v there exists a value
βˆ such that for all β > βˆ, Cov[v− p2, p2 − p1] > 0. (The expression for τˆ v is given in the
Appendix; see (A.28).)
Along the LIE, momentum is a sign of strong liquidity trading persistence and is due
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to the effect of the covariance explained by p1 in (31). This finding is consistent with
prices in that equilibrium being driven by liquidity trades, so here the predictability of
returns is a sign of poor informational efficiency. Indeed, it is possible to show that,
for β sufficiently large, momentum arises also in a model with no private information.43
Along the HIE, however, momentum occurs for any value of β ∈ (0, 1]. This means that
even though (a very mild) persistence is required, momentum in this case is not due to
liquidity trading. To the contrary, the HIE properties illustrated in Proposition 2 suggest
that momentum here is rather a sign of rapid price convergence to the fundamentals.
According to the “time series momentum” evidence, which spans a vast class of finan-
cial instruments, the lagged 12-month excess return on a given asset is a good predictor
of that same asset’s “one year ahead” return. In addition, Moskowitz, Ooi, and Ped-
ersen (2012) document the following patterns associated with time-series momentum:
(i) hedgers (who in our setup can be proxied by liquidity traders) have stable positions
for extended time periods and so induce a persistent price pressure, yielding continuation
of returns; (ii) speculators benefit from time-series momentum by going long in an asset
to exploit its anticipated price trend (at the expense of hedgers); (iii) the spot price of
the asset underlying the futures reacts slowly to information. These patterns are con-
sistent with behavior along the LIE. Indeed, along the LIE, the covariance of the long-
and short-term components of investors’ demand with liquidity traders’ demand has the
same (negative) sign; see equations (29a) and (29b). The implication is that investors
fully exploit the predictability of liquidity trades—while mildly offsetting their price im-
pact with their information so that prices are driven by liquidity trades. Under these
conditions, it pays to exploit liquidity traders’ predictability precisely because so little of
the information about fundamentals affects aggregate orders.
B Expected volume and return predictability
We now address the implications of our results for the expected volume of informa-
tional trading.
We start by computing the expected traded volume in the market with heterogeneous
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information net of the expected volume when there is no private information.44 We have
V1 ≡
∫ 1
0
E[|X1(si, p1)|] di−
∫ 1
0
E[|X1(p1)|] di
=
∫ 1
0
√
2
pi
Var[X1(si, p1)] di−
∫ 1
0
√
2
pi
Var[X1(p1)] di
=
√
2
pi
(√
a21τ
−1
ε + τ
−1
u −
√
τ−1u
)
(32)
and
V2 ≡
∫ 1
0
E[|X2(si, p1, p2)−X1(si, p1)|] di−
∫ 1
0
E[|X2(p1, p2)−X1(p1)|] di
=
∫ 1
0
√
2
pi
Var[ X2(si, p1, p2)−X1(si, p1)] di−
∫ 1
0
√
2
pi
Var[ X2(p1, p2)−X1(p1)] di
=
√
2
pi
(√
(a1 − a2)2τ−1ε + (1 + (β − 1)2)τ−1u −
√
(1 + (β − 1)2)τ−1u
)
. (33)
Using V1 + V2 to measure the total volume of informational trading, we obtain the
following result.
COROLLARY 2.7 (Expected volume of informational trading): Suppose τ η > 0. Then, at
equilibrium, for all β ∈ (0, 1] the expected total volume of informational trading is higher
along the HIE. When β = 0, only the equilibrium with a low total volume of informational
trading survives.
PROOF. Rearranging Corollary 2.3’s expressions for investor strategies yields xin =
anεin − θn for n = 1, 2. For a normally distributed random variable Y , we have
E[|Y |] =
√
2
pi
Var[Y ].
Since a∗∗∗1 > a
∗
1, it now follows from (32) that V1 is larger along the HIE. According
to (33), V1 + V2 is an increasing function of a1 for a1 > a2, a condition that is satisfied
along the HIE. Finally, by Corollary 2, if β = 0 then a∗1 < a2. 2
The intuition for Corollary 2.7 is straightforward: because investors in the HIE step
up their response to private signals, the position change due to private information is
higher along such equilibrium. Taken together, Corollaries 2.5 and 2.7 imply that a
high volume of informational trading in the second period predicts a continuation of
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returns regardless of how persistent liquidity trading is—a conclusion that accords with
the evidence presented by Llorente et al. (2002). Yet a low volume of informational
trading can also be associated with momentum as long as liquidity trading is persistent
enough. However, momentum in this case signals slow price convergence to the liquidation
value. In short, momentum is compatible with both a high volume and a low volume of
informational trading, but the implications of continued returns for price informativeness
are markedly different in the two situations.
The extant literature typically associates volume realizations with investors’ diver-
gence of opinions about the asset payoff (see, e.g, Kandel and Pearson (1995)). In our
setup, disagreement is measured as follows:
Disag = Var
[
Ein[v]− E¯n[v]
]
= Var[αEnεi] =
τ ε
τ 2in
. (34)
From this expression and Proposition 2, we conclude that disagreement is low (high)
along the HIE (LIE). This statement and Corollary 2.7 now imply the following.
COROLLARY 2.8: Total volume is high (resp., low) in the equilibrium with low (resp.,
high) levels of disagreement.
This corollary accommodates recent empirical evidence on the relationship between
the convergence of opinions and the trading volume around earnings announcements.
Indeed, Giannini, Irvine, and Shu (2013) find that large volume is actually compatible
with convergence of opinions—a result that runs counter to what most of the literature
on transaction volume implies.
Their finding can be explained as follows. From expressions (32) and (33) it is clear
that volume is increasing in a21/τ ε. We now use (19) and obtain
a21
τ ε
=
(
γ
λ2∆a2
Vari1[p2]
)2
Var[αE1εi]. (35)
The first component on the right-hand side of equation (35) captures the effect of in-
vestors’ perceived risk on volume; the second term coincides with our definition of dis-
agreement. Along the HIE (LIE), we know that disagreement is low (high) but we also
know that investors face little (considerable) risk concerning the price at which their po-
sitions unwind. The latter effect prevails in our setup, which implies that high trading
volume is a good proxy for low disagreement and low perceived risk. Our model predicts
in addition that, when volume is high and opinions are converging, prices should serve
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as a reliable signal of the underlying fundamentals.
REMARK 6: Up to know we have compared volume, disagreement and volatility across
equilibria. We can also explore how these magnitudes change within an equilibrium as
one deep parameter of the model changes. Our simulations show that the relationship
between volume, disagreement, and volatility as the precision of private information τ ε
changes is quite rich. In particular, along the LIE we find that an increase in τ ε leads to
higher total volume and lower conditional volatility. In some simulations this effect is due
to the increase in the first period expected volume (typically, with a low liquidity trading
persistence, second period expected volume is positively related to the conditional volatility
of returns). We also find that when liquidity trading is highly persistent (β close to 1),
expected volume is in both periods negatively related to the conditional volatility of returns.
At both dates, and as it should be expected, disagreement is hump-shaped in the precision
of private signals: it is close to 0 for τ ε close to 0, increases for small values of τ ε, and
finally converges back to 0 for τ ε large. First period volume is increasing in τ ε, while
second period volume can be hump-shaped (for β low) or increasing in τ ε (for β high).
The volatility of returns (conditional and unconditional) is instead always decreasing in
τ ε. It is possible, for example, that volume in period 2 increases while conditional volatility
decreases, and that volume in period 1 increases while disagreement decreases.
Finally, our findings on volume are also related to Banerjee (2011) and Kondor (2012).
The former paper compares differences of opinion (DO) models to rational expectations
(RE) models. One prediction is that in a DO model, differently from a RE one, the con-
ditional volatility of returns is negatively related to expected volume. This relation also
occurs in our RE setup with strategic complementarities, even though investors agree on
a common prior, in two distinct scenarios. First, we compare the patterns of volume and
volatility across the HIE and the LIE. In this case, coupling Corollary 2.7 and Numerical
Result 1, implies that when the economy starts at the HIE a switch from the HIE to the
LIE, e.g. because of a small increase in public signal precision, moves the market from
a combination of high total volume and low conditional volatility, to one with low total
volume and high conditional volatility. Second, we study the patterns of total volume and
volatility along the LIE as private signal precision increases. As we have seen in the re-
mark above we can have first and even second period volume increasing while conditional
volatility decreases as private precision increases. Hence, we conclude that observing a
negative correlation between trading volume and the conditional volatility of returns is
insufficient grounds for rejecting a RE model. We have also seen that, along the LIE, a
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more volatile market can be associated with more or less disagreement, depending on the
value of private precision. The potential positive relationship between disagreement and
volatility is consistent with empirical evidence in Gallant et al. (1992) and Kandel and
Pearson (1995).45 Kondor (2012) studies a two-period trading model with three-factor
fundamentals and short-term traders who have factor-specific information. In his model,
a public signal on the fundamentals generates disagreement because it leads traders to
compare their factor-specific private information to the public signal and thereby gauge
the magnitude of the factor about which they have no private information. The author
shows that an increase in the informativeness of public signals can, by facilitating dis-
agreement, generate large volume as well as prices that are not only more informative
but also more volatile (conditional on the public signal). Our model can produce similar
patterns for price volatility.46 However, in our setup the association between a burst in
trades and higher price volatility results from a public signal that is precise enough to
stabilize the HIE.47
C Stock price fragility
According to Greenwood and Thesmar (2011), a fragile asset is one that is vulnerable
to non-fundamental demand shocks. These authors find that ownership concentration
increases asset fragility but also that the active trades of hedge funds and mutual funds
can mitigate fragility by counteracting the effect of mutual funds’ flow-induced trades.
The idea is that if the mispricing induced by non-fundamental demand shocks becomes
large enough, then hedge funds will step in to correct it by taking offsetting positions.
Along the HIE, this hypothesis is in line with the mechanism outlined in (29a) and (29b).
Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) find that the distribution of offsetting trades is extremely
heterogeneous across stocks, with some stocks characterized by strong offsetting effects
and with other stocks for which this effect is relatively weak. Our analysis implies that
the former stocks should be those for which the HIE is likely to prevail and hence should
be associated with the combination of high trading volume and converging opinions.
Conversely, we predict that stocks associated with low volume and diverging opinions
should be more fragile.
D Identifying equilibria
We know from Jovanovic (1989) that models governed by multiple equilibria of struc-
tural parameters have severe identification problems and also that “the set of distributions
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on observable outcomes that are consistent with a given structure can be quite large.”
Positive identification results are obtained in a range of papers that use simple models
with multiple equilibria (e.g., discrete entry or binary games; see the accounts in Acker-
berg et al. (2007) and Berry and Tamer (2006)). Identification of structural parameters is
achieved through equilibrium refinements, shape restrictions, informational assumptions,
or the specification of equilibrium selection mechanisms. Alternatively, inference can be
based on the identified features of the models with multiple equilibria, which are sets of
values of the structural parameter vector (see, e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and the
refinement in Henry and Galichon (2011)).
In the model developed here, with two stable equilibria there is no equilibrium re-
finement or equilibrium selection mechanism to be used. Given the presence of strategic
complementarities in our model, a promising approach is the one of Echenique and Ko-
munjer (2009) based on monotone comparative statics (MCS) results. Unfortunately, the
type of multiplicity that arises in our paper fails to satisfy MCS, which this literature
requires for identification (see the Online Appendix).
Equilibria can nonetheless be identified based on their respective implications for spe-
cific market observables. According to Proposition 2, the inference component of the
spread is negative along the HIE and positive along the LIE. At the same time, by Nu-
merical Result 1 and Corollaries 2.7 and 2.8 we know that, in the HIE, the conditional
volatility of returns is low, trading volume is high, and these patterns occur with low
disagreement. Finally, Corollary 2.5 implies that in the HIE there is mild positive auto-
correlation of returns at short horizons.
More insights on identifying the specific features of each equilibrium can be obtained
by contrasting the qualitative properties of the HIE and LIE via numerical simulations.
In what follows we fix parameters’ values that yield a stable HIE, and positive return
autocovariance at the LIE and at the equilibrium with no private information (i.e., τ ε =
0). We then extract 1,000 i.i.d. normal shocks for v, u1, u2, and η, and average across
the prices and shocks. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 5, where we
plot the positions of liquidity traders at dates 1 and 2 followed by the simulated price
paths along the low-information equilibrium, the high-information equilibrium, and the
equilibrium with no private information.48 Our results further show that compared to
the HIE, along the LIE (i) short term returns are more strongly positively autocorrelated
as well as more easily predictable based on order flow information, and (ii) the expected
returns from liquidity provision investors obtain at both trading dates are higher.49
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[Figure 5 about here.]
Panel (a) in the figure displays the position of liquidity traders, which in this simula-
tion is (on average) positive at both dates. According to panel (b), if there is no private
information then prices mirror liquidity traders’ demand. Indeed, since short-term traders
are risk averse, they require compensation—for satisfying the positive demand of liquidity
traders—that is proportional to their perceived uncertainty about the payoff. That com-
pensation drives p1 above v¯ in this equilibrium. In panel (c) of Figure 5 we see that prices
display a qualitatively similar behavior along the LIE. Yet because traders are informed,
an > 0 and so part of liquidity traders’ shock is accommodated by offsetting specula-
tive orders (in this numerical example, sell orders). These orders transmit information
and thereby diminish investors’ perceived uncertainty about the payoff, which implies
that the price adjustment needed to accommodate θn is lower than in the τ ε = 0 case.
In the LIE, then, the price path reflects the liquidity traders’ position and is therefore
hump-shaped. Along the HIE (panel (d)), in contrast, the first-period price coincides
almost exactly with the semi-strong efficient price and with the full-information value.
In this equilibrium, traders aggressively speculate (sell) against the liquidity (buy) shock
θn based on their private information. This behavior drives p1 below v¯ and close to v,
accelerating price adjustment. These trades are highly informative and thus dramatically
reduce investors’ perceived uncertainty about the payoff, which explains why the price
nearly matches En[v] even though the market’s risk-bearing capacity is limited (γ <∞).
In this equilibrium, short-term trading offsets the impact of liquidity traders’ orders on
prices, and the price path is inversely hump-shaped.
Combining these observations with Proposition 2 and our previous results in Sec-
tion IV suggests a way to identify the HIE and the LIE from the data. Our model
predicts that the LIE arises for extreme values of public signal precision (which could be
proxied, e.g., by the number of analysts following a given security). This equilibrium is
characterized by (i) a positive inference component of the price impact, (ii) momentum or
reversal depending on the strength of trading persistence, (iii) high expected returns from
liquidity provision, (iv) prices that are far from the semi-strong efficient price, (v) high
short-horizon return predictability from order imbalances, and (vi) low volume accom-
panied by high levels of disagreement. Our model predicts that the HIE may arise for
intermediate values of public signal precision. This equilibrium is characterized by (i) a
negative inference component of the price impact, (ii) mild momentum, (iii) low expected
returns from liquidity provision, (iv) prices that are close to the semi-strong efficient price,
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(v) low short-horizon return predictability from order imbalances, and (vi) high volume
accompanied by low levels of disagreement. See Table I, which summarizes the model’s
empirical implications.
[Table 1 about here.]
The equilibrium predictions of Table 2 help us when using market data to distin-
guish among equilibria and also when seeking to discriminate among different behavioral
theories. The main implications of our findings can be listed as follows.
1. High volume associated with informative prices and low disagreement argues for
the HIE in relation not only to the LIE but also to alternative theories based on
differences of opinion and in which disagreement is associated with high volume.
2. A negative covariance between conditional volatility and volume need not disqualify
RE models (as suggested by Banerjee (2011), for example) because that finding is
consistent with our results in some scenarios.
3. A negative inference component of the price impact identifies the HIE and the oc-
currence of return reversals at short horizons identifies the LIE, with the maintained
hypothesis that our model holds.
4. If for fragile (non-fragile) stocks—in the sense of Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)—
there is a low (high) volume transacted when there is high (low) disagreement, then
that would constitute evidence for our LIE (HIE). In other words, fragility should
be associated with low trade volume and divergence of opinions.
E Meltdowns
Finally, our model can also shed some light on episodes of sudden liquidity dry-ups as
exemplified in severe form by the recent financial crisis. We offer an information-based
explanation that complements the standard one given in terms of insufficient arbitrage
capital.
The quant meltdown of August 2007. In the second week of August 2007, several
hedge funds started unwinding their holdings (arguably for non-informational reasons).
Khandani and Lo (2011) show that the price impact of trades spiked during the event.
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Their conclusion is that a lack of arbitrage capital (together with the increased importance
of high-frequency trading for market making) was largely responsible for the meltdown.
In our model, a large increase in price impact is consistent with an increase in the
volume or volatility of liquidity trading and a switch from the HIE to the LIE (since
then the HIE may disappear; see Figure 2(d)). In fact, the LIE prevails also when the
demand of liquidity traders becomes larger and more volatile. In that case, the retro-
spective inference and variance reduction loop weakens and the high-liquidity equilibrium
disappears. The alternative view is that even if capital had been abundant (with CARA
utilities there is no room for endowment effects), a similar meltdown could have occurred
if informational conditions were like those that we find.
The financial crisis and public information. Several authors have argued that,
during the 2007–2008 crisis, the selling pressure of investors drove asset values downward
and below the fundamentals (though this was followed by a rebound; Cella, Ellul, and
Giannetti (2013)). A possible reason for the occurence of such large corrections is the
lack of (or “slow moving”) arbitrage capital (Duffie (2010)), which exhausted the risk-
bearing capacity of liquidity suppliers. Our theory provides an alternative explanation
based on the absence of informational conditions that would have allowed for a milder
correction. In particular, the dearth of reliable public information (proxied here by a steep
reduction in τ η) may have reduced the market’s risk-bearing capacity, relegating most of
the economy to the LIE.50 As argued in the Online Appendix, if the market coordinates at
a HIE that poor public information has rendered unstable, then an additional mild shock
to public information leads this market to the LIE. Indirect evidence of such a transition
is that “contrarian” liquidity providing strategies were extremely profitable during the
financial crisis (as documented by Nagel (2012))—in line with our prediction of the LIE
derived in Section IV.D. With regard thereto our paper makes the additional prediction
that, in the cross section, the assets that underwent the most extreme corrections were
those for which the public information was poorest.51
V Conclusions
In this paper we argue that the persistence in liquidity traders’ positions has a sig-
nificant effect on the response of risk-averse, short-term investors to their private signals.
When the orders of liquidity traders are correlated across trading dates, investors reassess
the evidence (about the fundamentals) obtained at the early trading stage based on the
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new information gathered in the market. Such “retrospective” inference can generate
strategic complementarities in the use of private information that in turn can yield mul-
tiple stable equilibria, and these equilibria can be ranked in terms of price informativeness,
liquidity, and volatility.
Our analysis reveals that, if uninformed orders are predictable, then the effect of
investors’ short horizons on market observables depends on the quality of public infor-
mation. When public information is not much more precise than private signals, the
retrospective inference channel is not too strong; in this case, a stable equilibrium arises
that is characterized by low volatility, high liquidity, high price informativeness, high
volume, and low levels of disagreement. This equilibrium exists alongside another equi-
librium in which prices are more volatile and less informationally efficient, the market is
thinner, volume is low, and disagreement is high. When public information is either very
precise or very poor, the low-volatility equilibrium disappears or becomes unstable while
the high-volatility equilibrium survives. Thus our analysis indicates that there could be
a nonlinear effect of public information on market observables. Furthermore, our results
can guide the empirical literature investigating the effect of investors’ horizons on market
patterns as a means of identifying the stock characteristics associated with the high- or
low-volatility equilibrium.
Our paper also clarifies the role of higher-order expectations in asset pricing. With
liquidity trading persistence, prices are driven by average expectations about fundamen-
tals and about liquidity trading. This dynamic, in contrast to the Beauty Contest results
of Allen et al. (2006), can draw prices either systematically farther away from or closer to
fundamentals—along the LIE and the HIE, respectively—as compared with the consen-
sus of investors. We show that when public information is either very precise (compared
with private signals) or very poor, prices are farther away from fundamentals compared
to consensus. However, a public signal of intermediate precision makes the HIE stable,
thereby drawing prices closer (than consensus) to the fundamentals. We also link the HIE
and LIE to the magnitude of the inventory component of liquidity, to the price impact,
and to the returns from liquidity supply. Thus, our analysis establishes the limits of
the Beauty Contest analogy for financial markets and provides empirical implications to
assess the effect of HOEs on asset prices.
Table 2 summarizes the empirical implications of our model. We provide the observ-
ables that can discriminate among equilibria (under our model’s hypothesis) and among
behavioral theories as well. High trading volume associated with low conditonal volatility
and low disagreement discriminates in favor of our HIE against not only the LIE but also
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alternative, DO theories wherein disagreement is associated with high volume. Further-
more, a negative covariance between conditional volatility and volume does not preclude
the validity of rational expectations models because it is consistent with our model. We
find also that fragility (in the sense of Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)) should be as-
sociated with low transacted volume and divergence of opinions. In addition, our paper
provides an alternative interpretation for empirically documented regularities in the pat-
terns of return autocorrelation. The literature has only recently begun to investigate the
relationship between empirical regularities, such as the momentum effect, and the role of
HOEs in asset prices (see, e.g., Verardo (2009)). Our paper offers empirical predictions in
this regard, uncovering the existence of two types of momentum with very different infor-
mational properties. These findings can guide further research in the empirical analysis
of asset pricing anomalies.
Finally, our results have implications for the forces behind market meltdowns and
enable us to offer—as an alternative to explanations based on limits to arbitrage capital—
an accounting for the financial crisis in terms of a transition from the high- to the low-
information equilibrium in response to sudden changes in the volume of liquidity trading
or in the precision of public information.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove our argument, we proceed by backwards induction. In the last trading period
traders act as in a static model and owing to CARA and normality we have
X2(si, sP , z1, z2) = γ
Ei2[v]− p2
Vari2[v]
, (A.1)
and denoting by E¯2[v] ≡
∫ 1
0
Ei2[v] di,
p2 = E¯2[v] +
Vari2[v]
γ
θ2
= αP2
(
v +
θ2
a2
)
+ (1− αP2)E2[v], (A.2)
where
a2 = γτ ε (A.3a)
αP2 = αE2 . (A.3b)
Rearranging (A.2) we obtain
p2 =
αP2
a2
(a2v − βa1v + βa1v + θ2) + (1− αP2)E2[v]
=
αP2a2 + (1− αP2)∆a2τuτ 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ2
 z2 + τ ητ i2 sP + γτ 1E1[v] + βz1γτ i2
= λ2z2 +
τ η
τ i2
sP +
βαP2
a2
z1 + (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v], (A.4)
which provides an alternative expression for p2 which separates the impact on second
period “news” from the information contained in the first period price and the public
signal.
In the first period owing to CARA and normality, an agent i trades according to
X1(si, z1) = γ
Ei1[p2]− p1
Vari1[p2]
, (A.5)
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where, using (A.4),
Ei1[p2] =
(
λ2∆a2 +
τ η
τ i2
)
Ei1[v] +
γτ 1E1[v] + βz1
γτ i2
, (A.6)
Vari1[p2] =
(
λ2∆a2 +
τ η
τ i2
)2
1
τ i1
+
λ22
τu
+
τ η
τ 2i2
. (A.7)
Replacing (A.6) and (A.7) in (A.5) yields
X1(si, z1) = γ
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)Ei1[v]
Vari1[p2]
+
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
βαP2
a2
z1 + (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v]
)
− γ
Vari1[p2]
p1
= a1si +
a1τ 1
τ ε
E1[v] +
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
βαP2
a2
z1 + (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v]
)
− γ
Vari1[p2]
p1,
where
a1 = γ
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)αE1
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)2/τ i1 + λ
2
2/τu + τ η/τ
2
i2
. (A.8)
Imposing market clearing: x1 + θ1 = 0, which implies
a1v + θ1 +
a1τ 1
τ ε
E1[v] +
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
βαP2
a2
z1 + (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v]
)
=
γ
Vari1[p2]
p1.
Finally, solving for the equilibrium price and collecting terms yields
p1 = a1
(
Vari1[p2]
γ
+
βαP2
a2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
αP1
(
v +
θ1
a1
)
+ (1− αP1)E1[v]. (A.9)
2
Proof of Corollary 1.1
In the second period, rearranging (A.2), p2 = E2[v] + Λ2E2[θ2], where Λ2 = Vari2[v]/γ.
In the first period, from (A.9) we have
αP1 = a1
(
Vari1[p2]
γ
+ β
Vari2[v]
γ
)
.
By definition of the inventory component obtained in (13), Λ1 = αP1/a1. This implies
Λ1 =
Vari1[p2]
γ
+ β
Vari2[v]
γ
.
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2Proof of Corollary 1.2
For the second period price, see (A.4). For the first period price, we rearrange (A.9) to
obtain
p1 =
αP1a1 + (1− αP1)a1τuτ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ1
 z1 + (1− αP1)τ vτ 1 v¯. (A.10)
2
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove existence it suffices to note that in the first period, the equilibrium responsiveness
to private information is defined by the fixed points of the following function
ψ(a1) = γ
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)αE1
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)2/τ i1 + λ
2
2/τu + τ η/τ
2
i2
. (A.11)
By inspection φ(a1) ≡ a1 − ψ(a1) = 0 is a quintic in a1, and therefore always possesses a
real root. Note that at equilibrium a1 > 0, otherwise λ2∆a2 > 0, which in view of (A.11)
yields a contradiction.
Suppose that β > 0. To prove multiplicity we proceed as follows. Note that
φ(0) = −γ2τ ετu(a2 + γ(τ η + a22τu))(τ ε + τ η + a22τu + τ v) < 0 (A.12a)
φ(a2) > 0. (A.12b)
Therefore, there exists an equilibrium a∗1 ∈ (0, a2). Next, evaluating φ(·) at
a1 =
1 + γτua2
γβτu
,
yields
φ
(
1 + γτua2
γβτu
)
> 0,
while evaluating it at
a1 =
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
,
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yields
φ
(
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
)
< 0,
provided
β >
1
2
(A.13a)
γ2τ ετu >
2(2β − 1)
3− 2β (A.13b)
τ η ≤ τˆ η ≡ (1/4β − 3/8)γa
3
2τ
2
u + 1/2a
2
2τu(β − 1/2)
1 + γa2τu(3/2− β) . (A.13c)
Therefore, provided (A.13a), (A.13b), and (A.13c) are satisfied, a second equilibrium a∗∗1
exists in the interval (
1 + γτua2
γβτu
,
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
)
.
Given that φ(·) is a quintic, it must have an odd number of roots, which implies that
when (A.13a), (A.13b), and (A.13c) are satisfied at least another equilibrium a∗∗∗1 must
exist in the interval (
2 + 3γτua2
2γβτu
,∞
)
.
Given the location of the roots we can conclude that 0 < a∗1 < a2 < a
∗∗
1 < a
∗∗∗
1 . Further-
more, we have
1 + γτu∆a2 =
 > 0 for a1 = a
∗
1
< 0 for a1 ∈ {a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }
which implies that λ∗2 > 0, while λ
∗∗
2 < 0, and λ
∗∗∗
2 < 0. Finally, we prove that price
informativeness increases across the three equilibria. For τ 1 this is immediate, since it
increases in a1. For τ 2 as one can verify, given that a
∗
1 < a2 < a
∗∗
1 we have τ
∗
2 < τ
∗∗
2 .
Furthermore, for a2 > (1 + γτua2)/(γβτu),
∂τ 2
∂a1
> 0,
which implies τ ∗∗2 < τ
∗∗∗
2 .
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Suppose now that β = 0. Then, φ(·) becomes a cubic in a1:
φ(a1) = a
3
1τu((1 + γa2τu)
2 + γ2τuτ ν)− a21γ2a2τ 2u(a22τu + τ ε + τ ν) (A.14)
+ a1(3a2τu(a2(1 + γa2τu) + γτ ν) + τ v((1 + γa2τu)
2 + γ2τ ντ v) + τ ε + γ
2τu(τ ν + a
2
2τu)
2)
− γ2a2τu(a22τu + τ ε + τ ν)(τ v + a22τu + τ ε + τ ν),
with a negative discriminant. This implies that with β = 0 there exists a unique equilib-
rium in linear strategies with first period responsiveness a∗1. To locate the equilibrium,
note that
φ
(
γ2a2τu(a
2
2τu + τ ε + τ ν)
1 + γ2τu(a22τu + 2τ ε + τ ν)
)
= − γ
2a2τ ντu(a
2
2τu + τ ε + τ ν)
1 + γ2τu(a22τu + 2τ ε + τ ν)
< 0 (A.15a)
φ(a2) = a2(τ v + τ ε(1 + γ
2τu(τ ν + τ ε(3 + 2γa2τu) + τ v))) > 0. (A.15b)
Therefore,
a∗1 ∈
(
γ2a2τu(a
2
2τu + τ ε + τ ν)
1 + γ2τu(a22τu + 2τ ε + τ ν)
, a2
)
.
Furthermore, since
ψ′(a1) ∝ 2a1τu(γ2a2τu(a22τu + τ ε + τ ν)− a1(1 + γ2τu(a22τu + 2τ ε + τ ν)),
we also have that for β = 0, the weights to private information in the first period are
strategic substitutes.
2
Proof of Corollary 2.1
For any β ∈ [0, 1], in the second period an equilibrium must satisfy a2 = γτ ε. In the first
period, assuming τ η = 0, and using (A.8), at equilibrium a1 equilibrium must satisfy
φ1(a1) ≡ a1λ2(τ 2 + τ ε)− γτ ε∆a2τu
= a1(1 + γτu∆a2)− γ2τ ε∆a2τu = 0. (A.16)
The above equation is a quadratic in a1 which for any a2 > 0 and β > 0 possesses two
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positive, real solutions:
a∗1 =
1 + γτua2(1 + β)−
√
(1 + γτua2(1 + β))2 − 4β(γτua2)2
2βγτu
(A.17)
a∗∗1 =
1 + γτua2(1 + β) +
√
(1 + γτua2(1 + β))2 − 4β(γτua2)2
2βγτu
, (A.18)
with a∗∗1 > a
∗
1. This proves that for β > 0 there are two linear equilibria.
Inspection of the above expressions for a1 shows that βa
∗
1 < a2, while βa
∗∗
1 > a2. The
result for λ2, Var1[p2] follows from substituting (A.17) and (A.18), respectively in λ2 and
Var1[p2]. To see that prices are more informative along the HIE note that in the first
period Var[v|z1]−1 = τ 1 = τ v + a21τu. In the second period, the price along the HIE is
more informative than along the LIE if and only if
(1 + β2 + γa2τu((1− β2) + β(1 + β2)))
√
(1 + γa2τu(1 + β))2 − 4β(γa2τu)2
γ2β2τu
> 0,
which is always true. Given that τ i2 = τ 2 + τ ε, this also implies that Λ
∗∗∗
2 < Λ
∗
2. Finally,
substitution of (A.17) and (A.18) in Vari1[p2] shows that Vari1[p2]
∗∗∗ < Vari1[p2]∗. In
view of (15) this implies that Λ∗∗∗1 < Λ
∗
1.
When β → 0, along the HIE we have
lim
β→0
1 + γτu(a2 + βγτ ε) +
√
1 + γτu(2(a2 + βγτ ε) + γτu(a2 − βγτ ε)2)
2βγτu
=∞,
while along the LIE, using l’Hospital’s rule,
lim
β→0
1 + γτu(a2 + βγτ ε)−
√
1 + γτu(2(a2 + βγτ ε) + γτu(a2 − βγτ ε)2)
2βγτu
=
γa22τu
1 + γa2τu
.
From (A.19) it then follows that in this case αP1 < αE1 . Finally, defining
a∗10 =
γa22τu
1 + γa2τu
,
and taking the limit of λ2 as β → 0 when a1 = a∗10 yields
lim
β→0
λ∗2 =
1 + γτua2
γ(τ v + (a∗10)2τu + a
2
2τu + τ ε)
> 0,
whereas limβ→0 λ
∗∗∗
2 = 0. 2
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Proof of Corollary 2.2
Starting from the LIE, we need to verify that |ψ′(a∗1)| < 1, or that when a1 = a∗1,
γβa2τu < (1 + γτu∆a2)
2.
Substituting (A.17) on R.H.S. of the above inequality and rearranging yields
|ψ′(a∗1)| < 1 ⇐⇒
− 2(1 + a2γτu(1− β))(1 + a2γτu(1− β) +
√
(1 + γτua2(1 + β))2 − 4β(γτua2)2) < 0,
which is always satisfied. For the HIE, we need instead to verify that |ψ′(a∗∗∗1 )| > 1, or
that when a1 = a
∗∗∗
1 ,
γβa2τu > (1 + γτu∆a2)
2.
Substituting (A.18) on R.H.S. of the above inequality and rearranging yields
|ψ′(a∗∗∗1 )| > 1 ⇐⇒
2(1 + a2γτu(1− β))(−(1 + a2γτu(1− β)) +
√
(1 + γτua2(1 + β))2 − 4β(γτua2)2) > 0,
which is always satisfied, since the first factor in the product on the R.H.S. of the above
expression is positive, while manipulating the second factor shows that√
(1 + γτua2(1 + β))2 − 4β(γτua2)2 > (1 + a2γτu(1− β)) ⇐⇒ 4a2βγτu > 0.
2
Proof of Corollary 2.3
In the second period, the result follows from the fact that since at equilibrium a2 = γτ ε,
a2
αE2
=
γ
Vari2[v]
.
In period 1 we have
X1(si, z1) = γ
(λ2∆a2 + τ η/τ i2)Ei1[v]
Vari1[p2]
+
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
βαP2
a2
z1 + (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v]
)
− γ
Vari1[p2]
p1.
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Adding and subtracting (a1/αE1)p1 from the right hand side of the above expression
yields
X1(si, z1) =
a1
αE1
(Ei1[v]− p1) +
(
a1
αE1
− γ
Vari1[p2]
)
p1 +
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
β
γτ i2
z1 +
τ 1
τ i2
E1[v]
)
.
The second and third terms in the above expression can be rewritten to obtain(
a1
αE1
− γ
Vari1[p2]
)
p1 +
γ
Vari1[p2]
(
β
γτ i2
z1 +
τ 1
τ i2
E1[v]
)
=
β(1− αP1)− γτ 1αP1
a1τ i2Vari1[p2]
E1[θ1]
=
αP1 − αE1
αE1
E1[θ1].
Note, also, that setting ρ ≡ a1/a2, we can express
αP1 = αE1
(
1 +
(βρ− 1)τ 1
τ i2
)
. (A.19)
This implies that for a1 = a
∗
1, αP1 < αE1 , whereas the opposite holds for a1 ∈ {a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }.
To differentiate xi2 with respect to p2, we first express the information contained in a
trader’s forecast in terms of p2. To this end we use (A.4) and write
z2 =
1
λ2
(
p2 − τ η
τ i2
sP − βαP2
a2
z1 − (1− αP2)
τ 1
τ 2
E1[v]
)
.
Substituting the above in Ei2[v], and differentiating xi2 with respect to p2 yields
∂xi2
∂p2
= − γτ i2
1 + γτu∆a2
.
For a1 = a
∗
1, we know that ∆a2 > 0, so that the information effect reinforces the substi-
tution effect and the asset is a normal good. Conversely, when multiple equilibria arise,
for a1 ∈ {a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }, 1 + γτu∆a2 < 0, implying that the asset is a Giffen good.
Finally, to compute the conditional covariance we have
Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] = Covi1[v − p2, p2]
= Covi1[v, p2]− Vari1[p2]. (A.20)
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Using (16b), we obtain
Covi1[v, p2] =
1
τ i1
(
λ2∆a2 +
τ η
τ i1
)
.
On the other hand, from (A.11) we have
Vari1[p2] =
1
τ i1
(
λ2∆a2 +
τ η
τ i2
)2
+
λ22
τu
+
τ η
τ 2i2
.
Substituting these expressions in (A.20) and rearranging yields
Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] = − 1
γτ i1τ i2
(
λ2(τ i2 − τ η)
τu
+
∆a2τ η
τ i2
)
.
According to Proposition 2, when a1 ∈ {a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }, ∆a2 < 0 and λ2 < 0. Therefore,
Covi1[v − p2, p2 − p1] > 0. Conversely, along the LIE, the opposite occurs.
2
Proof of Corollary 2.4
We have already established in Corollary 2.3 that along the HIE (LIE) αP1 > αE1 (αP1 <
αE1). Now, using (12) the covariance between p1 and v is given by
Cov[v, p1] = αP1
1
τ v
+ (1− αP1)
(
1
τ v
− 1
τ 1
)
, (A.21)
and carrying out a similar computation for the first period consensus opinion
Cov
[
E¯1[v], v
]
= αE1
1
τ v
+ (1− αE1)
(
1
τ v
− 1
τ 1
)
. (A.22)
We can now subtract (A.22) from (A.21) and obtain
Cov
[
p1 − E¯1[v], v
]
=
αP1 − αE1
τ 1
, (A.23)
implying that the price at time 1 over relies on public information (compared to the
optimal statistical weight) if and only if the covariance between the price and the funda-
mentals falls short of that between the consensus opinion and the fundamentals. 2
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Proof of Corollary 2.5
To compute Cov[p2 − p1, p1 − v¯] we first note that
Cov[p2 − p1, p1 − v¯] = Cov[p2, p1]− Var[p1]. (A.24)
Next,
Cov[p2, p1] = Cov[E1[p2], E1[p1]] + Cov1[p2, p1] = Cov[E1[p2], p1].
Computing
Cov[E1[p2], p1] = Var[E1[v]] + (Λ1 + βΛ2)Cov[E1[v], E1[θ1]] + βΛ2Λ1Var[E1[θ1]]
=
a21τ 1
τ 1τ v
+ (Λ1 + βΛ2)
a1
τ 1
+ βΛ2Λ1
τ v
τ 1τu
,
and
Var[p1] =
a21τu
τ 1τ v
+ Λ21
τ v
τ 1τu
+ 2Λ1
a1
τ 1
.
Substituting these expressions in (A.24) and rearranging yields
Cov[p2 − p1, p1 − v¯] = −Vari1[p2]
γ
(
Λ1
τ v
τ 1τu
+
a1
τ 1
)
< 0.
Consider now Cov[v − p2, p1 − v¯], decomposing the covariance yields
Cov[v − p2, p1 − v¯] = Cov[E1[v − p2], p1] + Cov1[v − p2, p1 − v¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= −βΛ2 (Cov[E1[θ1], E1[v]] + Λ1Var[E1[θ1]])
= −βΛ2
(
a1
τ 1
+ Λ1
τ v
τ 1τu
)
= −βΛ2λ1 1
τu
,
which is always negative for β ∈ (0, 1], and null for β = 0. Finally, to compute Cov[v −
p2, p2 − p1] we decompose again the covariance
Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] = Cov[E1[v − p2], E1[p2 − p1]] + Cov1[v − p2, p2 − p1].
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Computing, E1[v − p2] = −βΛ2E1[θ1], and E1[p2 − p1] = (βΛ2 − Λ1)E1[θ1]. Therefore,
Cov[E1[v − p2], E1[p2 − p1]] = βΛ2Vari1[p2]
γ
Var[E1[θ1]]. (A.25)
Next, we obtain
Cov1[v − p2, p2 − p1] = (1 + γτu∆a2)(βa1∆a2τu − τ 1) + γτ ητuβa1
(γτ i2)2τ 1τu
. (A.26)
When a1 ∈ {a∗∗1 , a∗∗∗1 }, ∆a2 < −(γτu)−1, and the above expression is always positive,
which implies that along the HIE Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] > 0. 2
Proof of Corollary 2.6
To prove this result, we impose τ η = 0 in (A.25) and (A.26), obtaining
Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] = − λ2
γτ i2τu
(
1− β∆a2 τ i1 − τ v
a1τ i1
)
. (A.27)
Looking at (A.27) we again verify that along the HIE there is momentum. This is true
because in that equilibrium λ2 < 0 and ∆a2 < 0. Along the LIE momentum can occur,
depending on the persistence of liquidity trades. To see this, note that since in this
equilibrium λ2 > 0 and ∆a2 > 0, from (A.27) momentum needs
1− β∆a2 τ i1 − τ v
a1τ i1
< 0,
which can be rearranged as an (implicit) condition on the magnitude of β:
a1τ i1
∆a2(τ i1 − τ v) < β < 1.
If β = 0, the above condition is never satisfied. Indeed, in this case there exists a unique
equilibrium in which ∆a2 = a2 > 0. Therefore, when β = 0 returns always display
reversal. If β = 1, the condition is satisfied if
a1τ v + a1(τ ε + a
2
1τu) < ∆a2τu(τ ε + a
2
1τu).
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Isolating τ v in the above expression yields:
τ v < τˆ v ≡ (∆a2 − a1)(τ ε + a
2
1τu)
a1
, (A.28)
which, since a1 does not depend on τ v (see (A.17)), gives an explicit upper bound on τ v.
Hence, if τ v < τˆ v, there exists a βˆ such that for all β ≥ βˆ, when τ η = 0, momentum
occurs between the second and third period returns along the LIE. 2
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Appendix B. Online Appendix
Appendix A. Non-monotone comparative statics and dynamic adjustment
What is the effect of a shock to parameters’ values on the equilibrium of the market?
The answer to this question depends on whether the HIE is stable or not.
Starting from the case in which the HIE is stable, Figure 2 in the paper (panel (b))
implies that a decrease in private signal precision or in risk tolerance can have a non-
monotone effect on a1 and thus on the conditional volatility of returns, and informational
efficiency of prices. To see this, consider first the case of private signal precision. Suppose
that τ v = τu = 10, τ ε = 9.5, γ = 1/2, τ η = 3, and β = 1. With these parameter values,
the LIE and HIE are respectively a∗1 = 4.001, and a
∗∗∗
1 = 5.606, and correspond to the
intersection of the orange best response function with the 45-degree line in Figure 6 (panel
(a)). Suppose the market coordinates on the LIE. Suppose now that the precision of the
private signal decreases to τ ε = 7. The new best response is depicted by the dashed curve
in the figure. Again we have three equilibria with the LIE and HIE given respectively by
a∗,NEW1 = 2.906, and a
∗∗∗,NEW
1 = 4.124.
52 Which equilibrium does the market coordinate
on? With adaptive dynamics, we can see that this will be the HIE. Thus, in this case
a decrease in private signal precision determines an increase in the response to private
information and informational efficiency, and a decrease in the conditional volatility of
returns (along the initial LIE, Var1[p2] = 0.00035, while along the new HIE, Var1[p2] =
0.00013). Non-monotonicity requires however a sufficiently large reduction in private
precision.53 Indeed, in panel (b) we repeat the same exercise, assuming that τ ε is lowered
to 8. In this case, adaptive dynamics implies that the new equilibrium along the dashed
best response is the LIE. Panel (c) and (d) show that similar effects arise with a reduction
in risk tolerance.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Consider now the case in which the HIE is unstable. In this situation numerical
simulations show that starting from the HIE, the effect of a shock (even a very mild one)
to parameters’ values depends on the persistence of liquidity traders’ demand. In detail:
when β ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium converges to the LIE; when β = 1, the market oscillates
between two non-equilibrium values. In Figure 7, panel (a) we plot the best response
for τ v = τu = 10, τ ε = 20, γ = 1/2, τ η = 1/2, and β = .9. With these parameter
values, the LIE and HIE are respectively a∗1 = 9.04, and a
∗∗∗
1 = 12.25, and the slope of
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the best response at these two points is given by ψ′(a∗1) = −.41 and ψ′(a∗∗∗1 ) = −2.12. As
shown in the figure, perturbing the HIE an iterated application of the best response leads
the market to coordinate on the LIE. Consider now panel (b) where we plot the best
response for τ v = τu = 10, τ ε = 15, γ = 1/2, τ η = 1/2, and β = 1. With these parameter
values, the LIE and HIE are respectively a∗1 = 6.64, and a
∗∗∗
1 = 9.37, and the slope of
the best response at these two points is given by ψ′(a∗1) = −.43 and ψ′(a∗∗∗1 ) = −1.9. In
this case, iterating the application of the best response perturbing the HIE (after about
380 iterations) leads the market to oscillate between the non-equilibrium values 7.99 and
10.75. Thus, the implication is that, provided β < 1, if the market is at the HIE a small
shock to parameter values leads it to the LIE.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Appendix B. The effect of residual uncertainty
In this section we perform a robustness exercise and assume that investors face residual
uncertainty over the final liquidation value. Therefore, we model the final payoff as
vˆ = v + δ, where δ ∼ N(0, τ−1δ ) is a random term orthogonal to all the random variables
in the market, and about which no investor is informed. The addition of the random
term δ allows to study the effect of an increase in the residual uncertainty that surrounds
investors’ environment in periods of heightened turbulence, and shows that a price crash
can occur within our framework. Intuitively, when investors are faced with residual
uncertainty, they put less weight on their signals, since prices and private information are
less useful to predict the asset payoff. This is likely to weaken the retrospective inference
and variance reduction loop, eliminating the HIE. Our analysis shows, however, that in
general residual uncertainty does not eliminate the HIE, nor makes it unstable.
With residual uncertainty, the expressions for prices and investors’ strategies do not
change (that is, expressions (8), (19), and (20) in the paper hold). However, the equi-
librium obtains as the solution of a system of the following highly non-linear equations:
a2 = fa2(a1, a2) ≡
γτ ε
1 + κ
(B.1a)
a1 = fa1(a1, a2) ≡
γ2τ i2(∆a2(1 + κ+ γτu∆a2) + γτ η)τ ετu
(∆a2(1 + γτu∆a2 + κ) + γτ η)2τu + τ i1((1 + γτu∆a2 + κ)2 + γ2τ ητu)
.
(B.1b)
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Inspection of the cubic (B.1a) shows that it possesses a unique real solution, which can
therefore be substituted in (B.1b) to solve the equilibrium as a fixed point of a best
response in a1, fa1(a1, a2(a1)). In Figure 8 we show the plot of such a best response
mapping for the following parameterization: τu = τ v = 1, τ ε = 4, τ η = 2/3, γ = 1,
β = 9/10, and τ δ ∈ {40, 70, 75, 100}. When τ δ = 100, we have 5 equilibria, only two of
which are stable with respect to best response dynamics. Furthermore, the equilibrium
with a higher value of a1 displays a negative inference component of liquidity, as shown
by the first row of Table II.
[Figure 8 about here.]
This suggests that, when retrospective inference is not too strong, the presence of
residual uncertainty per-se is not sufficient neither to make the HIE disappear, nor to
make it unstable. Of course, as residual uncertainty increases, the strength of the loop
weakens even more and the HIE tends to disappear as shown by panels (b), (c), and (d)
in the figure, where we plot the best response for τ δ = 75, τ δ = 70, and τ δ = 40. Table II
collects the results of our calculations for the different values of τ δ.
[Table 2 about here.]
In our baseline simulation, we set τ v = 1, and find that for τ δ < 40, the HIE vanishes.
While at first blush this small level of residual uncertainty may seem to question the
relevance of the HIE, it possible to show that this parameterization is not uncommon in
calibrated asset pricing pricing models. For instance, Wang (1994) models the asset payoff
as a dividend process Ft+1 = ρFt+ωt+1, where Ft is a persistent component, and ωt+1 an
orthogonal random error term, which corresponds to our residual uncertainty term. The
coefficient ρ in this case parameterizes the impact of past fundamentals on current ones.
The fraction of variance coming from residual uncertainty in this framework is 1−ρ2 (that
is, the ratio between σ2ω and the steady-state variance of Ft+1, which is σ
2
ω/(1−ρ2)), which
in our framework corresponds to τ−1δ /(τ
−1
δ + τ
−1
v ). It is easy to show that with a value of
ρ ∈ (.98, .99), residual uncertainty in the dynamic model has a comparable importance
as the one implied by the parameter τ δ = 40. Thus, if for example we take our model
to represent trading patterns that occur at a quarterly frequency, this roughly implies a
critical value of ρ = .95 at a yearly frequency, which is not uncommon as a calibration in
asset pricing models.54
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Appendix C. Long-term investors
Consider the market with residual uncertainty but assume that now investors have a
long horizon and maximize the expected utility of final wealth. For simplicity we will deal
with the case where the public signal is useless (τ η = 0). In this case multiple equilibria
are also possible and the reasons are similar to those of the case with short-term investors.
A long-term investor in the first period speculates on short-term returns and takes
into account the hedging possibilities of second period trading. The equilibrium strategy
of investor i in the first period is in fact a linear combination of (Ei1[p2]−p1) and Ei1[xi2]
(Cespa and Vives (2012)).55 Were traders not to expect a change in prices, then their
optimal period 1 position would be like the one of a static market, and the risk of holding
such a position would only be due to the unpredictability of the liquidation value.56 If a
change in prices is expected, traders optimally exploit short-run price differences. Two
factors add to the risk of their period 1 position, as traders suffer from the partial unpre-
dictability of the price change, and from the impossibility of determining exactly their
future position. However, the opportunity to trade again in the future also grants a hedge
against potentially adverse price movements. This, in equilibrium, yields a risk-reduction
which when there is no residual uncertainty exactly offsets the price risk conditional on
private information. As a consequence, with no residual uncertainty, traders’ strategies
have a static nature in their response to private information.57 Still investors may spec-
ulate on price differences but only for market making purposes to profit from the mean
reversion of liquidity trading. With residual uncertainty strategies are truly dynamic
and informed investors speculate on short-term price movements based on their private
information.
We have that in equilibrium the responsiveness to private information (when informed
traders do not receive a new signal in the second period as in our base model, see Cespa
and Vives (2012)) is given by:
a1 =
γτ ε(1 + γτu∆a2)
1 + κ+ γτu∆a2
,
a2 =
γτ ε
1 + κ
.
When κ = 0 then a1 = a2 = γτ ε. With long-term investors, and under the assumptions of
the model, the feed-back loop that generates multiplicity is broken because the optimal
strategy of an informed trader is static (buy-and-hold): in the first period informed
traders receive their private signal, take a position and then in the second period there is
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no informed trading, the informed traders just make the market absorbing the demands
of liquidity traders.58
When κ > 0, a1 = ργτ ε/(1 + κ) with ρ > 1 at any equilibrium. The endogenous
parameter ρ captures the deviation from the long term private signal responsiveness due to
the presence of residual uncertainty. Thus, prior to the last trading round, investors react
to their private signals more aggressively than if the liquidation value were to be realized
in the next period. Indeed, while residual uncertainty makes investors less confident about
their signals, the presence of an additional trading round increases the opportunities to
adjust suboptimal positions prior to liquidation. This, in turn, boosts investors’ reaction
to private information. Residual uncertainty implies that informed investors speculate
on short-term price movements based on their private information. This makes possible
multiple equilibria. Indeed, faced with uncertain impending liquidation a long-term trader
in period 2 is not going to use much his private signal. This makes the trader behave in
the first period more like a short-term trader since he will try to unwind his first period
holdings in the market at time 2, and carry little of that inventory to the liquidation date.
In this case the liquidity of the second period market becomes much more important to
determine the trader’s reaction to private information in the first period and multiple self-
fulfilling expectational loops are possible as in the case with short-term traders. Again
the possibility of multiple equilibria is linked to having a negative price impact in the
second period (λ2 < 0) due to a large response to private information in the first period
(generating ∆a2 < 0). For example, three equilibra arise with τ δ = 200, τ ε = τ v = τu =
γ = 1 and β = .2 and only in the low a1 equilibrium we have ∆a2 > 0 and stability.
In general three equilibria are obtained for high β and high τ δ. Multiple equilibria may
arise also when there is a common shock in the private signal (Grundy and McNichols
(1989)).
In summary, with long-term risk averse investors and either residual uncertainty (He
and Wang (1995), and Cespa and Vives (2012)), or a common shock in the private
signals (Grundy and McNichols (1989)) there may be multiple equilibria. We may have
situations then with a negative price impact in the second period. This arises because in
those cases informed traders have incentives to use their private information to speculate
on short-term price movements and long-term traders may behave as short-term ones.
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Appendix D. Numerical simulations
We give here the details of the numerical simulation discussed in Section IV–D. We
assume that τ v = 0.01, τu = 0.1, τ ε = 1, γ = 1/2, τ η = 0.001862, and β = 1/2. With
these values, a stable HIE obtains ({a∗1, a∗∗∗1 } = {0.012, 41.25} with {ψ′(a∗1), ψ′(a∗∗∗1 )} =
{−0.012,−0.92}) and we obtain momentum along the LIE and in the unique equilibrium
with no private information (τ ε = 0). Next we set v¯ = 40 and extract 1,000 i.i.d. normal
shocks for v, u1, u2, and η, and average across the prices and shocks. Table III displays
the numerical results of this exercise.
[Table 3 about here.]
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Notes
1While the market presence of traditionally long-term investors such as institutions has steadily
increased during the last two decades, their holding period has decreased substantially (see OECD, http:
//www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48616812.pdf). Haldane and Davies (2011) examine
a large panel of UK- and US-listed companies over the period from 1980 to 2009; they find compelling
evidence of investors’ short-term bias, which is even more pronounced in the last 10 years of their sample.
2“Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those newspaper
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs,
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average pref-
erences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he
himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all
of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which,
to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating
what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise
the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
1936).
3In a related paper, we show that a similar conclusion holds in a model with long-term investors (see
Cespa and Vives (2012)).
4Part of the debate over the consequences of short-term trading revolves precisely around its al-
leged negative effect on the informativeness of asset prices (see, e.g., the “Kay review of UK equity
markets and long term decision making,” available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/
kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf ).
5Our model should be understood to fit low frequency (monthly–quarterly) patterns.
6That is, liquidity traders’ position are correlated across trading dates.
7The former captures the price variation due to the the change in asset exposure that investors
experience when clearing the market; the latter captures the price change due to investors’ inferences
from aggregate demand for the asset.
8This finding has an empirical counterpart: some spread decomposition models find that, consistent
with our HIE prediction, the spread’s inference component can be negative.
9In the absence of private information, our model is akin to a finite-horizon version of Spiegel (1998);
hence, in this case we can show that a unique equilibrium obtains.
10In his case, too, the analysis concentrates on the steady-state equilibrium; his results are therefore
not directly comparable to ours. Furthermore, information on fundamentals is short lived in Watanabe
(2008) whereas in our model it is long lived; this difference substantially changes the nature of the
inference problem faced by first-period investors. In related research, Dennert (1991) concentrates on
the steady-state solution in his OLG extension of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Private information is
short lived in this setup also.
11In a static trading model, Ganguli and Yang (2009) discuss complementarities in information acqui-
sition.
12We assume without loss of generality that, with CARA preferences, the nonrandom endowment of
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informed investors is zero.
13The unique equilibrium in linear strategies of this model is symmetric.
14This convention is justified in Section 3.1 of the Technical Appendix to Vives (2008).
15When risk-averse investors accommodate an expectedly positive demand of liquidity traders, the
former require compensation for risking that the liquidation value ends up being higher than the public
expectation (conversely, if E[u|p] < 0 then investors insist on a price that is lower than E[v|p]—to cover
the risk that v < E[v|p]). Such compensation is increasing in the uncertainty faced by investors (as
captured by Λ) and in the the extent of their anticipated exposure to the liquidity traders’ shock (i.e.,
their expected inventory E[u|p]).
16The adverse selection effect is a consequence of the signal extraction problem that dealers face in
this market: since a > 0, if investors on average have good news then they buy the asset and so E[v|p]
increases, reflecting that information. However, this effect cannot be distinguished from the buying
pressure of liquidity traders, which also has the effect of increasing E[v|p].
17As before, we assume (w.l.o.g.) that the nonrandom endowment of investors is zero.
18The equilibria in linear strategies of this model are symmetric.
19More specifically, suppose that we replace the first-period liquidity traders with a set of hedgers
in the interval [0, 1] and that each of these hedgers receives an idiosyncratic and normally distributed
endowment shock θi1 that is independent of the model’s other random variables. All hedgers take a
position in the asset at date 0. However, a fraction β of them (denoted HL) have a long-term horizon
and hold their positions until the liquidation date; the complementary fraction (denoted HS) has a short-
term horizon, and these hedgers liquidate their positions at date 2. Under this model we can show that,
in a linear equilibrium, the persistence coefficient corresponds to the β-weighted relative responsiveness
to the endowment shock displayed by HL (i.e., as compared with the average response of both HL and
HS). Since the responsiveness of hedgers is endogenous and since information is asymmetric, it follows
that that in this case a participation externality (similar to the one in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988),
Pagano (1989), and Dow (2004)) arises. Namely, hedgers’ decisions to trade in the first period depend
on market liquidity, which in turn depends on hedgers’ decisions to trade. This new loop can generate
multiplicity with different levels of hedging activity.
20Coval and Stafford argue in more detail that fire sales occur in mutual funds that follow specialized
investment strategies and that exhibit considerable overlap in their holdings.
21Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) develop a methodology to estimate the probability of informed
trading from transaction data.
22When computing E¯1[θ1] we have z1 = Ei1[z1] = a1Ei1[v] + Ei1[θ1], and Ei1[θ1] = z1 − a1Ei1[v] =
a1(v − Ei1[v]) + θ1. Computing average expectations yields E¯1[θ1] = a1(v − E¯1[v]) + θ1. Finally, using
E¯1[v] = αE1v + (1− αE1)E1[v] yields the expression in the centered formula above.
23We have that αP2 = αE2 and so 1− αP2 ∈ (0, 1).
24 This is because, for given p1 and z1 = a1v + θ1, a higher value for θ1 provides stronger evidence
that the fundamentals v is low.
25Retrospective inference plays an anlaogous role as the “inference augmentation” effect in Goldstein
and Yang (2014).
26It is worth noting that Huang and Stoll (1997) assumes uninformed market orders to be generated
by an AR(1) process, and the estimated parameter of that process turns out to be positive and close
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to 1. Negative inference components also occur in different spread decomposition models. For example,
Hamm (2014) investigates the effect of exchange-traded funds on the liquidity of underlying stocks and
estimates a spread decomposition model based on Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). In
several of her findings, the inference component of the spread is negative—leading to the exclusion of
such “out-of-range” observations. See also Foucault, Pagano, and Ro¨ell (2013), Ch. 5.2.2.
27Public precision has little effect on the equilibrium ex ante, while the degree of risk tolerance has an
effect similar to that of private precision.
28Along the HIE, second-period investors facing a large positive demand for the asset will adjust their
estimate of the fundamentals downward, which implies that the inference component of λ2 is negative.
Other things equal, a more precise public signal reduces the absolute value of the inference component,
which works to increase first-period investors’ uncertainty about p2. In the LIE, the converse statement
holds.
29It is easy to see that in equilibrium a1 = γ/
(
τ−1 + τ
−1
2
)
and therefore we have always that ∆a2 > 0
and λ2 = τu∆a2/τ2 > 0.
30This claim follows immediately from the inequality ψ(0) > 0; hence the best-response mapping cuts
the 45-degree line from below at the IIE, which implies that ψ′(a∗∗1 ) > 1.
31As shown in Figure 4, the responses of traders to private information in the HIE and the LIE
are strategic complements or substitutes depending on the parameters. For given τε, the higher is τη
the more likely it will be for at least one of the two equilibria to display strategic complementarities.
For instance, when β = 1, γ = 1/2, τu = τv = 10, τε = 8, and τη = 2.5 we obtain (a
∗
1, a
∗∗∗
1 ) =
(3.32, 4.8) and (ψ′(a∗1), ψ
′(a∗∗∗1 )) = (−0.4,−0.23). Increasing τη to 3 yields (a∗1, a∗∗∗1 ) = (3.34, 4.73) and
(ψ′(a∗1), ψ
′(a∗∗∗1 )) = (−0.32, 0.03). Finally, if we further increase τη to 5 (resp., to 8), then the HIE
disappears and we obtain a∗1 = 3.44 with ψ
′(a∗1) = −0.05 (resp., a∗1 = 3.59 with ψ′(a∗1) = 0.25).
32We can prove that (29a) is larger (in absolute value) at the HIE than at the LIE when τη = 0, and
our numerical simulations indicate that this difference holds also when τη > 0.
33See Admati (1985) and Cespa (2005) for discussions about the existence of Giffen assets due to
information effects in the context of a multi-asset REE model.
34To see this, observe that ∂xi2/∂p2 = (a2/αE2)(∆a2τu/λ2τ i2− 1) = −γτ i2/(1 + γ∆a2τu). Along the
HIE (resp., LIE), as shown in Proposition 2, 1+γ∆a2τu < 0 (resp., 1+γ∆a2τu > 0). These inequalities
prove the result.
35We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this calibration exercise.
36This strategy is of the form xi1 = Γ
1
2(Ei1[p2] − p1) + Γ22Ei1[xi2], where Γ12 and Γ22 are equilibrium
parameters and Ei1[xi2] = Λ
−1
2 (1− λ2∆a2)(Ei1[v]− pˆ1).
37If the asset price is not expected to change in response to today’s information, then the market is
not expected to receive any new private information and so the model collapses to one in which traders
hold the risky asset for two periods. In that case, those positions naturally coincide with the ones they
would hold in a static market.
38Indeed, a long-term trader who faces uncertain impending liquidation will find his private signal to
be of little use in period 2. As a result, such a trader will behave in the first period more like a short-term
trader: he will try to unwind his first-period holdings in the market at time 2 and thus carry little of
that inventory to the liquidation date.
39Numerical simulations in a three-period model show that, along the HIE, both Cov[v − p3, p3 − p2]
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and Cov[p3 − p2, p2 − p1] are positive.
40One can easily verify that Cov[v−p2, p1− v¯] = Cov[E1[v−p2], E1[p1− v¯]] = −βΛ2 Cov[E1[θ1], p1] < 0
and Cov[p2 − p1, p1 − v¯] = Cov[E1[p2 − p1], E1[p1 − v¯]] = (βΛ2 − Λ1) Cov[E1[θ1], p1] < 0.
41Suppose that E1[θ1] < 0. Then our pricing equation (14) implies a reduction in p1 so that a risk-
averse investor will be awarded higher expected returns, inducing her to absorb the shock. Indeed, we
have E1[p2 − p1] = (βΛ2 − Λ1)E1[θ1] > 0. If β > 0 then selling pressure is likely to persist, which
implies that prices will be depressed again at date 2 and will thus ensure positive expected returns:
E1[v − p2] = −βΛ2E1[θ1] > 0. In this way, the persistence of liquidity trades offsets the mean reversion
effect resulting from the first period’s short-term investors’ unwinding at date 2.
42Proposition 2 shows that in this case 1+γτu∆a2 < 0, which by (31) implies that Cov1[v−p2, p2−p1] >
0.
43This claim can be demonstrated by computing limτε→0 Cov[v− p2, p2− p1] = (β− γ2τvτu)/γ4τ2uτ3v,
which implies that momentum in this case arises when β > γ2τvτu.
44In a market with no private information, investors absorb only the orders of liquidity traders. In
equilibrium, then, their positions reflect only liquidity traders’ demand and so E[|x1|] = ((2/pi)τ−1u )1/2.
This approach is taken by He and Wang (1995), among others.
45The relationshio also contrasts with Banerjee (2011) who predicts a negative relation between dis-
agreement and volatility in the high volatility equilibrium of his RE model.
46The result is consistent with the positive association between volume and conditional volatility found
in Gallant at al.(1992).
47 For example, set τu = τv = 10, τε = 1, τη = .2, γ = 1/2, and β = 1; then we obtain two stable
equilibria, a∗1 = .29 and a
∗∗∗
1 = .86. By Corollary 2.7, volume is higher along the HIE. Furthermore,
calculating price volatility yields Var[p1]
∗∗∗ = .05 and Var[p2|sP ]∗∗∗ = .07, as compared with Var[p1]∗ =
.02 and Var[p2|sP ]∗ = .04. Thus, price volatility is larger in the HIE compared to the LIE in the first
(resp. second) period.
48The green line in panels (b), (c), and (d) of the figure is the (log of the) average of the semi-strong
efficient prices obtained in the simulations—that is, ln((1/1000)
∑1000
j=1 Enj [v]), n = 1, 2. The horizontal
line in the plots for the price paths is the (log of the) average value of the fundamentals (in this simulation,
ln(38.08) ≈ 3.64).
49The former finding is consistent with the evidence presented by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2008), who find that short-horizon return predictability from order flows declines when the market is
more liquid. The details of the simulation are available in the Online Appendix.
50For instance, Gorton and Metrick (2010) report that repo depositors during the crisis “did not know
which securitized banks were most likely to fail.”
51Nagel (2012) finds that the stocks of small, illiquid, and highly volatile companies generated the
largest contrarian returns during the financial crisis.
52 In both cases the HIE is stable case since (∂ψ/∂a1)|a1=a∗∗∗1 = −.24, and (∂ψ/∂a1)|a1=a∗∗∗,NEW1 = .35.
53 Denoting respectively by ψ and ψNEW the orange and dashed best responses, non monotonicity
requires that that ψ(a∗1) > ψ
NEW (a∗∗,NEW1 ). If the reduction in private precision is such that ψ(a
∗
1) >
ψNEW (a∗∗∗,NEW1 ), the new equilibrium along the dashed best response is still the HIE, but monotonicity
is restored since a∗∗∗,NEW1 < a
∗
1.
54We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this calibration exercise.
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55It is of the form xi1 = Γ
1
2(Ei1[p2]−p1) + Γ22Ei1[xi2] where Γ12 and Γ22 are equilibrium parameters and
Ei1[xi2] = Λ
−1
2 (1− λ2∆a2)(Ei1[v]− pˆ1).
56Intuitively, if given today’s information the asset price is not expected to change, no new private
information is expected to arrive to the market and the model collapses to one in which traders hold for
two periods the risky asset. Their position, then, naturally coincides with the one they would hold in a
static market.
57In fact, when β = 1 we have that xi1 = E[xi2|si, p1]. When β < 1 traders speculate also on price
changes based on public information.
58If informed traders were to receive a second signal in the second period then there would be informed
trading in this period but still the strategies would be static and price impact would still be positive.
The reason is that the trading intensity in the second period will always be larger than the one in the
first period, a2 = γ (τε2 + τε1) > a1 = γτε, because private information about the liquidation value
accumulates over time. With long-term traders we can not have negative price impacts when the joint
information of traders reveals the liquidation value.
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β = 0
β ∈ (0, 1]
LIE HIE
Reliance on public information High High Low
Liquidity Low Low High
Price impact (period 2)
{
+ + −
Strong Strong Weak
Price informativeness Low Low High
Risky asset (period 2) Normal Normal Giffen
Expected total volume of informational trading Low Low High
Return correlation at long horizons − − −
Return correlation at short horizons − ± +
Disagreement High High Low
Conditional volatility High High Low
Table I: The Beauty Contest revisited.
τ δ {(a∗1, ψ′(a∗1)), a∗2, λ∗2} {(a∗∗1 , ψ′(a∗∗1 )), a∗∗2 , λ∗∗2 } {(a∗∗∗1 , ψ′(a∗∗∗1 )), a∗∗∗2 , λ∗∗∗2 } {(a∗∗∗∗1 , ψ′(a∗∗∗∗1 )), a∗∗∗∗2 , λ∗∗∗∗2 } {(a∗∗∗∗∗1 , ψ′(a∗∗∗∗∗1 )), a∗∗∗∗∗2 , λ∗∗∗∗∗2 }
100 {(.8,−.29), 1.86, .43} {(5.02, 3.8), 1.42,−.007} {(6.2,−.28), 1.23,−.02} {(19.6, 5.8), .25,−.0002} {(21.9,−46.6), .21,−.02}
75 {(.78,−.29), 1.82, .44} {(5.2, 4.11), 1.26,−.005} {(7.5, .31), .88,−.01} {(12.06, 2.45), .45,−.005} {(15.38,−26.78), .3,−.0004}
70 {(.77,−.29), 1.81, .44} {(5.28, 4.1), 1.21,−.005} {−−,−−} {−−,−−} {(14.03,−22.55), .33,−.0005}
40 {(.72,−.3), 1.69, .47} {−−,−−} {−−,−−} {−−,−−} {−−,−−}
Table II: Equilibrium values and values of the derivative of the best response mapping at
equilibrium for the plots of Figure 8.
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LIE HIE Equilibrium with τ ε = 0
Cov[v − p2, p2 − p1] 735 7× 10−6 4.8× 108
Cov1[v − p2, p2 − p1] −37 7× 10−6 −284, 200
Cov[z1, p2 − p1] −801 −1.7× 10−6 −5.7× 106
E1[v − p1] −81 −0.005 −568, 700
E1[p2 − p1] −80 −1.7× 10−7 −568, 600
Table III: Autocovariance of returns (unconditional and conditional), return predictability
from order flows, and expected returns from liquidity provision in the numerical example.
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LIE
IIE
HIE
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
(1)
Figure 1: The best-response mapping (22) for β = 1, γ = 1/2, τu = τ v = 10, τ η = 3, and
τ ε = 7.5.
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τη=0τη=1/10τη=1/2τη=3τη=5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
ψ(1)
Figure 3: The best-response mapping (22) when the public signal’s precision ranges
within the set {0, 1/10, 1/2, 3, 5}. The other parameter values are β = 1, γ = 1/2,
τu = τ v = 10, and τ ε = 7.5. When τ η = 0, note that ψ(·, τ η) diverges at the point
aˆ1 ≡ (1+γτua2)/(γβτu) and the IIE disappears. For τ η > 0, we have ψ(aˆ1, .1) = 3.75864,
ψ(aˆ1, .5) = 3.75862, ψ(aˆ1, 3) = 3.7585, and ψ(aˆ1, 5) = 3.7584.
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Figure 4: The equilibrium set for β = 1, γ = 1/2, τu = τ v = 10, τ η ∈ {0, .01, . . . , 10}, and
τ ε ∈ {.01, .02, . . . , 10}. The black line denotes the set τ η = τ ε. For values of (τ ε, β) in
the white and yellow regions, the equilibrium is unique, whereas multiple equilibria (ME)
obtain when (τ ε, β) are in the other regions, where the HIE can be stable or unstable
depending on the difference between τ η and τ ε.
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